Global democracy appears fragile. According to the V-Dem Project, 41% of the world’s population now live in countries that are moving in an authoritarian direction, part of what researchers call a “third wave of autocratization” that has eroded democratic norms to levels not seen since the late 1970s. At the same time, economic globalization has continued apace — a trend many once expected would broaden political freedom in non-democratic states. Yet many authoritarian regimes have become more repressive as they liberalize their economies.
Jose Kaire, a political scientist at Arizona State University, examines this surprising pattern in his book The Road to Repression. His starting puzzle is simple: for decades scholars and policy makers argued that reducing state control over the economy would weaken dictatorships by shrinking the government’s role as employer, lender and gatekeeper. Privatization, deregulation and openness to trade were expected to create economic autonomy for citizens, enabling independent businesses and civic groups to challenge entrenched rulers. That line of thinking informed the Washington Consensus and remains influential in some circles.
But empirical evidence tells a more complicated story. Kaire documents numerous cases — including Mexico, Malaysia and Senegal — where human rights abuses and political violence increased after economic opening. Roughly half of the world’s autocracies that liberalized their economies followed a similar trajectory. Why would policies meant to undercut authoritarian power sometimes intensify repression?
Kaire’s answer centers on the politics of regime insiders: the party officials, military officers, bureaucrats and other elites who hold influence inside autocratic systems. Economic liberalization reshuffles economic power in ways that threaten those insiders’ privileges and sources of influence. New business elites, independent entrepreneurs or opposition forces can emerge from an opened economy and potentially weaken the old guard’s control.
For a dictator, that is a political risk. If elite backers feel their positions are imperiled, they may withdraw support or even contemplate a coup. When elites are powerful relative to the leader, maintaining their loyalty becomes a priority. Repression then becomes a tool not only for silencing dissent but for managing elite politics: cracking down on outsiders signals that the leadership will protect insiders’ interests and preserve the status quo within the regime.
In this logic, repression serves a bargaining function. By targeting opposition groups and independent actors, a leader compensates ruling coalition members for the costs of economic reforms that otherwise reduce elite influence. At the same time, repression allows the national leadership to comply with international pressures for market-oriented reforms — and thereby avoid sanctions or withdrawal of aid — without surrendering control to domestic rivals. Kaire shows, for instance, how Mexican presidents used repression against previously tolerated opponents to placate party and military elites while pursuing economic change.
The effect of liberalization therefore depends on the internal balance of power. When regime elites are strong, opening the economy often triggers harsher domestic control. When elites are weak and the leader’s hand is relatively unconstrained, liberalization does not generate the same countervailing repression because the ruler can reshape the coalition more freely.
How does this framework apply to contemporary cases like Cuba and Venezuela? Both countries have faced outside pressure to relax state controls, and yet both have shown increased repression even as they take tentative economic steps. In Cuba, power has been redistributed in recent years: the party and the military have consolidated roles and secured economic privileges that make them more autonomous of the individual leader. That expansion of insider power means further economic opening risks provoking the dynamic Kaire describes — strengthening insiders and prompting the regime to crack down on perceived outsiders.
Venezuela may be following a similar path. Recent removals of top leaders and pressure from external actors could create openings for regime insiders to expand their influence. If those insiders grow stronger relative to a new central authority, economic deregulation might again be accompanied by intensified repression rather than liberalization of politics.
Kaire’s work also highlights some surprising extensions of the core argument. He was inspired by personal stories — his father’s account of factory reorganization in Mexico — which initially seemed like a narrow anecdote. But cross-national research and statistical analysis showed the pattern was much more widespread: many dictatorships that opened their economies subsequently increased repression. He also expected, and found, that fears of international prosecution can amplify this effect: leaders who fear legal consequences abroad may cling more tightly to power and rely on elite appeasement through repression to secure their positions.
Looking ahead, Kaire suggests the same dynamics could arise around other shifts in the economy, not just classic trade and privatization. The rise of artificial intelligence, for instance, creates new centers of wealth and influence. In China, Xi Jinping has centralized oversight of the AI sector and elevated party control over technology firms, while disciplining entrepreneurial actors who appear independent. If new technological sectors create elite groups whose fortunes depend on their relationship with the leader, they could either strengthen the regime’s cohesion or, if they empower outsiders, trigger repression as leaders move to protect incumbent elites.
The broader lesson is that economic change in authoritarian settings has political consequences that depend on internal elite structures. Opening markets does not mechanically produce democratization; in many cases it reshapes the distribution of power inside the regime and can make leaders more repressive as they try to balance international expectations and the demands of powerful insiders.
Jose Kaire is professor of political science at Arizona State University. This summary draws on his research exploring how economic liberalization and elite politics interact to shape human rights outcomes in autocracies.
