Global democracy looks fragile. Recent measurements show that about 41 percent of the world’s population live in countries that are becoming more authoritarian — part of what analysts call a third wave of autocratization that has rolled back democratic gains to levels not seen since the late 1970s. At the same time, the global economy has become more integrated, a change many economists once predicted would nudge authoritarian states toward political liberalization.
That expectation, associated with thinkers like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek and embedded in policy prescriptions known as the Washington Consensus, is simple: weaken state control over the economy through privatization, deregulation, and opening to trade and investment, and you reduce citizens’ dependence on the regime. As people gain jobs, credit, and opportunities outside the state’s patronage networks, they should be better placed to organize, press demands, and push for political freedoms.
But reality has not followed that script. In many autocracies that opened their economies, repression rose. Cases such as Mexico, Malaysia, and Senegal — and about half of all autocracies that liberalized, according to the research discussed here — showed increased human rights abuses after economic opening. Why would policies intended to weaken authoritarian rule sometimes make it harsher?
Jose Kaire, a political scientist at Arizona State University and author of the book The Road to Repression, argues that the answer lies in the politics of regime insiders: the party officials, military officers, and other elites who hold power under authoritarian rule. For those insiders, economic liberalization is not merely an economic reform; it is a political threat.
When the economy opens, new actors can gain wealth and influence — business entrepreneurs, rival factions, or opposition figures — and those newcomers can potentially dilute the entrenched privileges of the ruling coalition. A dictator who tries to liberalize therefore risks alienating the very elites whose support keeps them in power. Because losing elite backing raises the chance of a coup or forced removal, leaders with strong elites must manage that internal threat carefully.
Repression becomes a tool of elite management. By cracking down on opposition groups and potential challengers, the leadership demonstrates its commitment to defending the interests of the established coalition. The logic is not only about silencing dissent for its own sake; it is about signaling to insiders that their position will be protected even as the economy changes. In some historical examples, Mexican presidents used repression against previously tolerated opponents to compensate party elites for reforms that undercut those elites’ political dominance.
This strategy also helps regimes navigate international pressures. External actors and financial institutions often push for economic liberalization. A leader can comply with those demands while using repression at home to placate domestic elites who otherwise would resist reforms. Repression, in other words, lets rulers satisfy both international economic prescriptions and internal political survival needs.
How this plays out depends on the balance of power between the leader and the elites. When elites are strong relative to the leader, repression is more likely as leaders try to shore up their position. When elites are weak, leaders have more room to maneuver without resorting to heavy coercion.
That distinction matters for contemporary cases like Cuba and Venezuela. In Cuba, reforms in recent years have strengthened the institutional role of the party and expanded the military’s economic autonomy, shifting power away from a single leader. Those empowered elites can press demands on the leadership; under such conditions, further economic opening can trigger more repression as the regime protects insiders. Recent crackdowns on dissidents in Cuba fit this pattern.
Venezuela may follow a similar logic. The removal of a dominant leader can create space for regime insiders to carve out new influence. If those insiders become stronger, opening parts of the economy could prompt repression as a way to secure elite interests. Whether that happens depends on how the internal balance of power evolves.
Two findings from Kaire’s research were especially striking. First, the pattern of liberalization followed by increased repression is widespread enough that statistical analysis shows it is common across many autocracies, not just an occasional anomaly. Second, the dynamics extend beyond traditional economic sectors. Leaders who fear international prosecution, for example, may be especially willing to repress to avoid losing power and facing accountability at institutions like international courts.
Looking ahead, the same logic applies to new sources of wealth and influence, such as the technology and artificial intelligence sectors. When industries produce new elites, those actors can either become alternative bases of support for leaders or challenge established insiders. China’s approach to AI illustrates one path: centralizing control of the sector in organs close to the top leadership, promoting firms aligned with the ruler’s priorities, and disciplining independent entrepreneurs. If new tech elites depend on the leader, the leader gains flexibility vis-a-vis old elites; if not, tensions could produce repressive responses.
The broader takeaway is that economic opening does not automatically generate political liberalization. Changes in the economy reshape elite bargains inside authoritarian regimes. Where reforms threaten entrenched insiders, leaders often respond by increasing repression to manage elite politics and preserve their hold on power. In those circumstances, international pressure to liberalize markets can inadvertently deepen human rights abuses rather than ease them.
Jose Kaire’s work reframes the debate about markets and democracy: the political consequences of opening are meditated by internal regime contests, not just by market forces or popular demand. Understanding those elite dynamics is essential if policymakers want to anticipate when economic reforms might improve civic freedoms and when they might make repression worse.
