When the United States renamed Pacific Command to Indo‑Pacific Command on May 30, 2018, it acknowledged that strategic competition with China stretches well beyond the South China Sea. Subsequent initiatives—most visibly the Quad and AUKUS—have rightly broadened focus across ocean basins, but they have tended to concentrate on the eastern Indian Ocean where Beijing’s activities are most obvious. The western Indian Ocean and Africa’s coastal states, however, are no less consequential and risk being treated as an afterthought.
China’s presence in the region is pan‑regional. Beijing’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, opened in August 2017 beside Camp Lemonnier, signaled ambitions that exceed logistics and counter‑piracy patrols. From Djibouti the People’s Liberation Army Navy can project power across the western Indian Ocean and into the Red Sea, complementing its reach in the east. Additional Chinese arrangements—from access in Cambodia to growing ties with island states such as Mauritius—further expand that footprint.
Recent moves make Washington nervous for good reason. London’s plan to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius raises practical questions about the future of Diego Garcia, the long‑standing US‑UK installation there. If Mauritius were to tilt toward Beijing, a key Western foothold in the central Indian Ocean could be weakened.
Yet US strategy documents acknowledge the Indo‑Pacific while often marginalizing Africa. The 2025 US National Security Strategy stresses a free and open Indo‑Pacific but tends to frame Red Sea security as a Middle East problem, overlooking how actors such as Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland shape maritime access. The Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes China as a pacing challenge but minimizes India’s role and reduces Africa largely to counterterrorism concerns. That approach risks ceding influence west of the Bay of Bengal to Beijing.
The United States and India face a strategic choice. New Delhi can either step up proactively in the western Indian Ocean to deny China strategic space, or coordinate more closely with Washington to do so jointly. Either path requires treating African littorals as central to Indo‑Pacific strategy rather than peripheral.
India already has forward elements—INS Jatayu at Minicoy is a start—but deeper engagement is necessary. Practical options include expanding port and logistics access in Agalega, pursuing security and economic ties in northern Madagascar, and securing basing or port arrangements in East African hubs such as Mombasa or Zanzibar. Those moves would be as much about development and commercial ties as about naval posture: investment, trade, and soft power can build durable alternatives to Beijing’s strategic lending.
Diplomacy and recognition choices matter too. India’s caution on recognizing Somaliland reflects concerns about territorial integrity, but Somaliland’s de facto autonomy and unique security environment present partnership opportunities. Formal engagement—whether bilateral or coordinated with the United States—could strengthen local governance, protect maritime approaches, and raise the cost to China of further encroachment.
Resource and development diplomacy can strengthen cooperation beyond security. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s mineral wealth and Mozambique’s gas resources—especially in northern Cabo Delgado—offer areas for joint US‑India investment that combine American influence in continental capitals with Indian experience in coastal infrastructure and port development. Targeted projects in places like Pemba could reduce drivers of instability while creating economic interdependence that crowds out malign external actors.
Operationally, the US and India should pursue a pragmatic division of labor: India leads engagement with island and littoral states; the United States focuses on continental security partnerships and regional architectures. Together they should reassess basing needs across the basin, improve interoperability between Indian naval deployments and US air and logistics facilities, and design economic initiatives that provide credible alternatives to Chinese projects carrying hidden strategic strings.
Rhetoric alone will not shift the balance. To check Beijing effectively across the whole Indian Ocean, Washington must fold Africa into its Indo‑Pacific calculus and rebuild robust, operationally meaningful cooperation with New Delhi. Otherwise the axis of influence in the Indian Ocean risks tilting decisively toward China—not just in the South China Sea or the Bay of Bengal, but across the western basin as well.
