Artificial intelligence is unlikely to create a brand-new form of terrorism, but it does make familiar methods cheaper, faster and easier. That is the core finding of recent policy research, and it matches what I found when examining how the two leading jihadi movements of this century — al‑Qaida and the Islamic State — are engaging with AI.
Both movements and their affiliates, media arms and supporters are already using AI for propaganda, recruitment, security and operational planning. Yet they do not approach the technology in the same way: differences in organizational culture, strategy and time horizon shape how each group experiments with and talks about AI.
The Islamic State’s approach
The Islamic State has long emphasized fast, professional, spectacle-driven media. At the height of its self-declared caliphate it built a sophisticated media operation that prized speed and high production values. That instinct carries into the AI era, where a younger, digitally fluent cohort of supporters is quick to try new tools and publish results.
Since 2023, Islamic State–linked networks and sympathizers have circulated growing volumes of AI-generated material: images, synthetic anchors, multilingual propaganda and rapid translations. After a high-casualty attack in Moscow in 2024, for example, supporters circulated a bulletin that used an AI‑generated Arabic-speaking anchor to frame the violence as part of the group’s ongoing campaign. Affiliates have also explored AI to speed translation and widen their audience reach.
Some Islamic State publications have gone further, at times urging followers to learn about AI. One affiliate framed AI literacy as a near-obligatory skill for adherents, equating digital competence with the practical requirements of struggle; the religious label attached to this claim was later retracted after criticism, but the practical guidance remained. That episode illustrates a pattern: rapid experimentation and mobilization, followed by quick doctrinal corrections when necessary.
In short, Islamic State discourse treats AI primarily as a tool to master now — a means to gain immediate tactical, communicative and psychological effect and to avoid falling behind adversaries who already exploit these capabilities.
Al‑Qaida’s approach
Al‑Qaida’s networks are experimenting with AI too, though their posture reflects a different organizational logic. Pro‑al‑Qaida outlets circulated likely AI‑generated imagery early on, and some have produced guides and workshops on using chatbots and other tools. Affiliates such as al‑Shabaab have used AI tools to translate messaging into multiple languages, and investigators in at least one major attack alleged that perpetrators relied on online tutorials and large language models to research explosives.
At the same time, influential parts of the pro‑al‑Qaida ecosystem are framing AI within long‑running debates about strategy and the nature of war. One noteworthy example is a multi‑installment series by a pro‑al‑Qaida foundation that translated Western strategic writing on AI, cyberwar and technological change and presented these texts alongside commentary. Those installments repeatedly return to questions about human agency, political purpose, endurance and whether machines or superior weapons can replace will and perseverance.
Rather than rejecting AI, that discourse tests assumptions: it asks whether technological advantage can decide outcomes or whether endurance and political cohesion remain decisive. This fits al‑Qaida’s broader strategy of a generational struggle in which patient, deliberate adaptation and survival matter more than short‑term spectacular gains.
Implications of different cultures
Both movements therefore adopt overlapping practical uses of AI — propaganda production, translation, multimedia manipulation, and some operational research — but their priorities and framings differ.
The Islamic State’s urgency and emphasis on visible effect encourage quick adoption of tools that produce immediate returns: flashy videos, rapid multilingual outreach, and techniques that amplify impact now. Al‑Qaida’s slower, more deliberative outlook leads it to combine practical adoption with deeper strategic reflection about what technology does and does not change in war and politics.
Those differences matter for what each group will try next and how it will use those capabilities. A group focused on immediate effect will prize tools that deliver spectacle and rapid reach; a group focused on endurance will invest in tools that support resilience, secure communication and long‑term influence, and it will interrogate how technology affects strategy and legitimacy.
Both movements also show concern about the dangers of AI: warnings about deepfakes, debates over reliance on automated research, and steps to teach supporters how to protect themselves from adversary use of the technology. That defensive side — how to avoid being deceived, exposed or outpaced — is part of the same calculus.
Conclusion
AI is a multiplier of existing tendencies rather than a revolutionary force that creates wholly new forms of violent political action. Al‑Qaida and the Islamic State both use AI for similar practical ends, but the technology is being folded into very different institutional logics. The Islamic State treats AI mainly as a tool to be mastered quickly for immediate advantage and spectacle. Parts of the pro‑al‑Qaida ecosystem use the technology too, but also place it within longer debates about war, endurance and political will. Those differing perspectives will shape which tools each movement adopts, how they deploy them, and what kinds of risks and opportunities follow.
Sara Harmouch is a research fellow in counterterrorism at George Washington University.
