Four months after US forces deposed Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has entered a period of rapid economic change while much of the old political architecture remains intact. Vice-president Delcy Rodríguez moved into the presidency with clear US backing and has begun reversing central elements of the Bolivarian project, even as she preserves tight political control.
The Bolivarian experiment began under Hugo Chávez in 1999 with widespread nationalizations, state-directed redistribution of oil revenues and expanded social spending. Maduro, Chávez’s successor after 2013, presided over a severe economic collapse and a steady erosion of democratic checks and balances.
Reorienting a revolutionary regime is inherently risky. Historical examples show that simultaneous political liberalization and economic turmoil can topple authoritarian systems. China’s leaders studied the Soviet collapse and concluded that opening the economy while preserving political control was the safer path; Rodríguez appears to be pursuing a similar model in Venezuela, prioritizing market-oriented reforms while guarding the state’s political monopoly.
In practice, that has meant a mixed personnel and policy picture. Rodríguez has overseen a sizeable reshuffle of the cabinet—thirteen of thirty-two ministries have new leadership—and has pushed through laws and regulations that roll back aspects of Chávez-era nationalizations. Sectors long closed to private investors, particularly hydrocarbons and mining, are being reopened, and a new Commission for the Evaluation of Public Assets has begun auditing state holdings in agriculture, manufacturing and infrastructure. Observers expect significant privatizations or sales to private investors.
Yet many of the key military-aligned figures who sustained Maduro’s rule remain influential inside the government. High-profile officials were moved into different posts rather than purged, and the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) still controls the major state institutions: the national assembly, supreme court, electoral authorities, police and military. PSUV governors hold office in 23 of 24 states, giving the party deep administrative reach to approve investor-friendly measures and legal guarantees meant to reassure capital, including access to international arbitration.
The US has played a visible role in the transition. Sanctions and legal pressure that targeted Rodríguez have been lifted, and other former regime loyalists are likely watching to see whether cooperation will secure them similar concessions. Venezuela has also resumed formal dealings with the International Monetary Fund after a suspension in 2019; IMF officials report productive talks with Rodríguez’s team.
Despite these openings, core political demands remain unresolved. The new government has not committed to a presidential election, and moves toward amnesty and the release of political prisoners have slowed. Although an amnesty law passed in February led to the release or easing of restrictions for more than two thousand people, hundreds remain imprisoned, and the law is reportedly under revision rather than being fully implemented.
Short-term risks are significant. Frustration at stalled justice and democratic reform could erupt into protests once opposition leaders can mount sustained campaigns at home. Maria Corina Machado, a prominent opposition figure who was barred from running in the July 2024 presidential election, has signalled a planned return and is expected back before the end of 2026. Many hoped Machado would assume a leading role after Maduro’s removal; instead she has been sidelined in US decision-making despite close ties to some US officials. On the international circuit she has emphasized political liberalization, accountability and justice rather than endorsing Rodríguez’s market reforms.
Longer-term questions center on the kind of political economy Rodríguez’s reforms will produce. The current strategy aims to attract investors into oil and mineral extraction—reviving the country’s historical reliance on commodity exports. That model risks re-entrenching the economic mono-dependence that contributed to Venezuela’s chronic instability from the 1970s onward and undermines the Bolivarian promise of diversifying the economy and redirecting resource wealth toward broad social development.
In short, four months on, Venezuela is changing in important economic ways but not yet in the political structures that shaped the previous decades. The government is opening markets and courting international finance while keeping a tight grip on political power. Whether this controlled pivot will deliver sustained investment, revive public trust, and avoid renewed social unrest remains uncertain.
Julia Buxton, Professor, School of Law and Justice Studies, Liverpool John Moores University
