Republished with permission from Pacific Forum.
In the 1990s President Lech Wałęsa dreamed of Poland becoming “a second Japan.” Instead Poland has become NATO’s principal logistics hub supporting Ukraine. That transformation offers a useful—though imperfect—comparison for imagining Japan playing a similar role for Taiwan. Asking whether Japan could become a sustainment hub raises hard questions about alliance strategy, burden-sharing, domestic politics and the limits of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Poland’s role evolved quickly from modest transfers into a full-spectrum support hub: weapons, humanitarian aid, refugee processing, maintenance, medical care and training. That shift demanded large investments to fix wartime logistics problems—rail-gauge mismatches, border bottlenecks and limited transport capacity. With backing from the United States, NATO and the EU, Warsaw expanded rail capacity, streamlined customs and upgraded transport infrastructure. Crucially, Poland’s political economy favored this transition: broad public support for helping Ukraine and willingness to mobilize domestic resources and spending.
Japan faces a very different set of practical and political obstacles. Taiwan is an island separated by more than 100 kilometers of water, so any large-scale sustainment operation would rely entirely on sea and air lines of communication—modes that are exposed to interdiction. Japanese leaders increasingly call a Taiwan contingency an “existential crisis” for Japan, and Beijing’s reactive measures show how public debate and posture can provoke diplomatic and coercive counters.
To serve effectively as a logistics hub for Taiwan, Japan would need extensive expansion of ports, airports and storage facilities not only on the Nansei Islands closest to Taiwan but across the archipelago. Japan would have to receive, hold and organize shipments from the United States, Australia and Europe before forwarding them—stretching already congested terminals, customs systems and transport networks. Unlike Poland, which benefits from NATO’s collective-defense guarantee, Japan would confront the possibility of strikes across the Western Pacific in a Taiwan invasion scenario, including risks to US bases on Japanese soil. China’s “gray zone” tactics could also disrupt shipping and air routes without triggering automatic alliance responses.
Deterrence here involves a paradox. Too little visible preparation invites the gamble that Taiwan could be seized before allies can assemble sufficient sustainment. Too much visible buildup risks provoking Beijing or accelerating its contingency planning. Some experts argue that military upgrades are best concealed until they are operational, but secrecy clashes with democratic transparency and with the political need to reassure Taiwan and domestic constituencies.
Taiwan’s own structural vulnerabilities compound the logistics challenge. The island depends heavily on imports: food self-sufficiency is limited, energy imports exceed 90 percent, and stockpiles of critical materials are thin. The merchant fleet has declined and many vessels sail under flags of convenience, which may be unavailable in crisis. Taiwan’s current procurement and resilience policies are not designed for a prolonged, comprehensive blockade.
Domestic politics in Japan further complicate any hub-building agenda. A sudden surge of military cargo would strain customs and port administrations; local governments and communities with pacifist traditions may resist expanded basing, storage or transport projects. Public sentiment toward China is mixed—Beijing is simultaneously a major trading partner and a principal security concern—so the kind of national consensus Poland enjoyed is absent.
US strategic planning adds another dimension. Recent American documents stress burden-sharing and a strategy that leans more on a smaller set of highly capable, trusted partners. If Washington prepares to fight a great-power war with select allies rather than broad coalitions, countries like Japan could be asked to do more than provide logistics: they may be expected to act as forward partners capable of managing higher-end threats. For Japan that would require deeper investment in defense capabilities and posture: integrated command-and-control, expanded ISR, and political readiness to host forward-deployed systems—steps that go beyond the current upward trend in defense spending.
Given the risks of provocation and domestic backlash, Washington should not assume Japan can or should be treated as a simple analogue to Poland. A more pragmatic approach favors incremental, sustainable capacity-building: gradual infrastructure upgrades; dispersing logistics responsibilities through minilateral arrangements with Australia, South Korea and the Philippines; and policies that avoid concentrating political exposure on a single state. Emphasizing deterrence by denial—strengthening Taiwan’s ability to withstand and repel an attack so that invasion is costly and unlikely—addresses the most immediate threat more effectively than relying primarily on sustainment logistics from abroad.
Any serious external logistics plan also requires Taiwan to reduce its own fragilities. Boosting food security, diversifying and stockpiling energy supplies, and increasing reserves of critical minerals and components are prerequisites for external sustainment to be meaningful. Without greater Taiwanese resilience, a major Japanese logistics build-up would have limited strategic payoff.
At the same time, allies should preserve selective economic interdependence with China as an asymmetric lever. Complete decoupling would eliminate bargaining chips that could be used to impose heavy costs in wartime and might remove incentives for Beijing to refrain from using force. Calibrated ties give the United States and partners leverage while keeping open diplomatic and economic channels.
Choices made now about alliance roles, burden-sharing and deterrence will shape strategic options for years to come. Simple analogies to Europe obscure the Indo-Pacific’s unique geography and politics. The central question is not whether Japan can become “a second Poland,” but whether the United States and its regional partners can design a tailored framework for Taiwan’s security—one that blends military preparedness with diplomatic restraint, builds partner capacity without unnecessary provocation, and distributes burdens in a politically sustainable way.
Stephen R. Nagy, PhD, Professor of Politics and International Studies, International Christian University, Tokyo; Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute; Director of Policy Studies, Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies.
Paweł Behrendt, PhD, University of Vienna alumnus; researcher on Japan and China foreign and defense policies and security in East Asia; author on East Asian strategic issues.
