How al-Qaida and ISIS Differ in Adopting AI

Artificial intelligence is unlikely to create a wholly new kind of terrorism, but it does make existing methods cheaper, faster and easier—reducing friction for propaganda, recruitment, target selection and operational planning. That is the premise of recent policy work, and it is borne out in materials and activities from affiliates and media networks tied to both al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Yet the two movements are not approaching AI in the same way: their different organizational cultures shape how they adopt, debate and use the technology.

Shared uses, different rhythms

Across both networks, supporters and affiliates have experimented with generative AI for visual and audio propaganda, automated translation, chatbot-based instruction, and tools to improve operational security or research. Both movements circulate guides and workshops on using AI, and both warn followers about deepfakes, surveillance and manipulation. But beyond these practical overlaps, patterns diverge.

The Islamic State: speed, spectacle and mobilization

The Islamic State has long prioritized rapid, high-production media that emphasizes immediacy and visual effect. That instinct carried into the AI era: supporters and outlets linked to the movement have produced AI-generated anchors, synthetic videos and images, and multilingual content designed to reach global audiences quickly. Instances include AI-created Arabic-speaking anchors used to frame terrorist attacks and a steady flow of AI-generated imagery and translated releases across platforms.

ISIS affiliates also push a mobilizing narrative: learning and using AI is framed as necessary to avoid being outpaced by enemies. In mid-2025 a Voice of Khorasan issue—linked to the group’s Afghanistan affiliate—presented AI literacy as a pressing duty for individual supporters, casting technical know-how as part of the struggle. Although some doctrinal claims were later softened after internal criticism, the instructional material remained, illustrating a pattern of fast adoption followed by ideological correction. The overall logic is pragmatic: mastery of available tools now produces visible gains in reach and impact, and rapid experimentation is rewarded.

Al-Qaida: deliberation, debate and strategic framing

Al-Qaida’s networks and media arms are experimenting with AI too—circulating likely AI-generated images, offering chatbot workshops and producing guides on how to use emerging services. Affiliates such as al-Shabaab have used AI tools to translate messaging into multiple languages. Investigations into attacks have also reported that operatives turned to open-source tools, tutorials and large language models for practical research.

Where al-Qaida differs is in the way parts of its intellectual and media ecosystem place AI within a longer strategic debate. Some pro-al-Qaida outlets have translated and discussed Western scholarship on AI, cyberwar and the future of conflict, asking whether machine intelligence can change the essence of warfare, replace human judgment, or relieve the need for political will and endurance. One multi-installment series translated Western analyses of AI and war and used them to test core assumptions about human agency, morale and the limits of technological supremacy.

That deliberative posture reflects al-Qaida’s organizational strategy: it sees its struggle as a generational war of attrition in which resilience, political purpose and will matter more than short-term technological edge. Consequently, while supporters are taught how to use AI, there is also sustained reflection on whether the technology alters the political calculus or merely changes tactics.

Implications of divergent approaches

These differences matter for what the groups prioritize and how quickly they integrate particular tools. The Islamic State’s emphasis on immediate, visible effects favors rapid adoption of consumer-facing AI capabilities—synthetic media, quick translation, and automated content production—to amplify spectacle and recruitment. Al-Qaida’s more patient, theory-oriented approach encourages experimentation but pairs it with doctrinal debate about strategy and human factors, potentially slowing some operational adoption while deepening analytic engagement.

Both movements, however, recognize AI’s practical value and the risks it creates—both as a tool they can exploit and as a threat they must guard against. The result is a mixture of rapid innovation and cautious theorizing across jihadi networks: practical use of current tools alongside ongoing efforts to assess how those tools interact with longer-term goals.

Understanding these internal differences helps explain not only which AI tools each movement adopts next, but why they use them in particular ways. The Islamic State will likely keep chasing immediacy and spectacle, while al-Qaida will continue to fold AI into broader debates about strategy, endurance and the nature of war.

Sara Harmouch is a research fellow in counterterrorism at George Washington University.