Less than a week after hosting Donald Trump, China’s president Xi Jinping received Russia’s Vladimir Putin in Beijing. Unlike the high-profile, unusual visit by Trump, Putin’s trip was routine: the two leaders have met more than 40 times since 2013, and this visit marked Putin’s 25th trip to China. They signed a bundle of agreements covering energy, higher education, media and other areas, underscoring the expanding scope of bilateral collaboration.
At the heart of Sino-Russian cooperation since the post–Cold War era has been opposition to US global dominance. That message resurfaced in Beijing, where Xi and Putin issued a joint pledge to build a multipolar world and a “new type” of international relations. But translating such rhetoric into concrete, coordinated action has repeatedly proved difficult.
In practice, Moscow and Beijing often choose low-cost ways to push back against US initiatives: blocking or opposing Western-backed measures at the United Nations and using diplomatic leverage to stymie policies they dislike. They have, however, refrained from mounting major, joint campaigns to directly confront US power. Their muted reactions to the ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and their limited engagement in support of Iran in its conflict with the US and Israel illustrate that restraint.
A core reason for this cautious approach is a growing asymmetry in capabilities. Russia lacks the economic and technological capacity to assist China in the areas central to Beijing’s rivalry with Washington. The Russian market is too small and risky to offset the impact of US tariffs on Chinese goods or to absorb large-scale Chinese exports without complications. Moscow is also unable to provide a meaningful backdoor around US export controls that restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductor, manufacturing and AI equipment.
Western sanctions combined with repeated failures to modernize have left Russia lagging in advanced technology. Since 2022, Moscow has increasingly depended on Chinese components—from consumer electronics to telecommunications equipment—and on Chinese know-how in certain defense-relevant domains. Meanwhile, China occupies the stronger position: it has political, financial and economic instruments that could support Russia, and Beijing has selectively used them.
China’s support for Russia has been calibrated. Chinese state media echo Russian narratives blaming the West for geopolitical tensions, and Beijing has supplied dual-use parts—such as microchips and fiber-optic components—that have practical value for Russia’s military and industry. Yet China has stopped short of sending lethal weaponry, and its armed forces, though they train and patrol jointly with Russia in the Asia-Pacific region, do not conduct similar operations in Europe.
Beijing has also been cautious on big economic projects. The long-delayed Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, touted as a way to replace lost European revenues for Russia, remains a commitment China has not finalized. That hesitation highlights Beijing’s tendency to prioritize its own interests and move deliberately rather than fully accommodate Moscow’s needs.
The result is a partnership in which China largely sets the terms. Russia appears willing to accept a “junior partner” role: the Kremlin has avoided confronting Beijing on issues such as Chinese deployments in parts of Central Asia that were formerly Moscow’s sphere of influence. Chinese leaders put effort into projecting parity—careful language, choreographed meetings and visible cooperation—to minimize any sense of imbalance.
Still, anxiety exists in Russia about growing dependence on China. Several cases of Russian scientists accused of spying for China and convicted under treason charges point to distrust within security circles. Moscow has sought to hedge by bolstering ties with other Asian states, including India and Vietnam, countries with which it has historical relations and which are wary of Chinese dominance.
In short, the Xi–Putin partnership is meaningful and far-reaching in many domains, but it is neither limitless nor without friction. Their shared call for a multipolar order and a “new type” of relations serves strategic signaling more than it signals a fully unified alternative to Western-led institutions. The asymmetry in resources and priorities, along with mutual caution about escalation, keeps the alliance pragmatic, selective and constrained.
Marcin Kaczmarski, Lecturer in Security Studies, University of Glasgow. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.
