President Donald Trump faces one of the most consequential questions of the war with Iran: will he order U.S. forces into Iran to secure roughly 970 pounds of enriched uranium that could be used to build nuclear weapons? Trump has repeatedly said a main goal is to ensure Iran “never have a nuclear weapon,” but he has been vague about how far he will go to dismantle Tehran’s weapons program — including whether to recover or destroy near‑bomb‑grade material believed buried under rubble at a mountain facility hit in U.S. strikes he ordered last June.
Nuclear experts and lawmakers say recovering that material would likely require a substantial ground operation inside Iran, a risky and politically fraught move for a president who has pledged to avoid long, costly Middle East deployments. Lawmakers warn that if Iran’s hard‑liners consolidate power during the conflict, they would have even stronger incentives to weaponize the program, making control of the enriched uranium critical. If weaponized, the stockpile could theoretically yield as many as 10 nuclear bombs.
Some critics argue Trump’s approach has created a situation that will demand troops on the ground. Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D‑Conn.) said the president’s shifting objectives mean the United States may need a physical presence in Iran to secure the uranium. Republican supporters say contingency plans exist but have offered few details. Sen. James Risch (R‑Idaho) said “a number of plans” have been discussed, while Sen. Rick Scott (R‑Fla.) acknowledged he has not been briefed on a way to accomplish the mission without boots on the ground and argued the stockpile cannot be left intact.
Nearly three weeks into a conflict that has left hundreds dead, strained alliances and hurt the global economy, the administration has been deliberately opaque about deliberations. When asked about the enriched uranium, Trump declined to discuss specifics, saying only that the U.S. has “hit them harder than virtually any country in history has been hit” and that the campaign is not over. He later asserted the strikes had neutralized the threat, saying Iran “doesn’t have nuclear potential.” Defense Department figures have likewise resisted public disclosures about possible operations, saying there is no advantage to telegraphing plans and that the administration has multiple options.
Experts say seizing or destroying the enriched material is feasible but difficult. Richard Goldberg, who led countering-Iranian weapons-of-mass-destruction efforts on the National Security Council during Trump’s first term, said such an operation could be executed if the president decides to pursue it. U.S. and Israeli forces have reportedly worked to secure conditions — especially total air superiority — that would let special operations teams, trained to disable centrifuges and handle nuclear material, operate. But the mission would be more complex than recent rapid raids; retrieving buried canisters would likely require clearing rubble, heavy construction equipment and extended security for personnel and logistics.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi has said much of the enriched uranium appears to remain at the three Iranian sites hit last year, with a large portion buried under rubble at Isfahan and smaller amounts at Natanz and Fordow. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told CBS’ Face the Nation that Iran had offered to dilute the stockpile in talks with U.S. negotiators, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, before the bombing campaign began; those talks did not produce a deal.
In testimony before a Senate committee, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard characterized U.S. attacks as having “obliterated” Iran’s enrichment program and buried underground facilities. She said U.S. agencies are monitoring for any Iranian attempts to restart enrichment; so far they have not tried to rebuild the capability. Gabbard added that the clerical authority supervising Iran’s government has been degraded by Israeli strikes but remains intact.
Analysts estimate a substantial footprint would be required to extract or neutralize the material. Brandan Buck of the Cato Institute suggested an effort could need more than 1,000 troops at each site and would take significant time and resources. Not acting also carries risk: if hard‑liners control the regime and retain access to enriched material, their incentives to pursue a weapon would increase.
“As it stands, the administration has set ambitious goals but sought to limit U.S. costs,” Buck said, arguing that those competing impulses have put the president ‘‘between a rock and a hard place.” If the U.S. elects to secure the uranium directly, planners would face complex operational, logistical and political challenges; if it does not, the presence of the material could become an even greater strategic danger.
