Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 became the biggest military conflict in Europe since World War II. Most Europeans back Ukraine, but a measurable minority across many countries expresses ambivalence or even sympathy for Russia. Understanding who these people are and why they hold pro‑Kremlin views matters because public opinion shapes governments’ willingness to supply military and financial aid.
What we studied
A cross‑national analysis used two academic surveys conducted in late 2023, covering almost 30,000 respondents in 18 European countries. Respondents were asked who they hold responsible for the war and which side they want to win. Answers to those questions were strongly correlated and varied widely between countries: support for a Russian victory is virtually non‑existent in Poland, while it approaches roughly 20% in Slovakia.
Four possible drivers
We tested four plausible explanations for pro‑Russian attitudes:
– Economic interests (for example, households hurt by energy price rises)
– Ideology (cultural conservatism, authoritarian attitudes)
– Partisan alignment (supporters taking cues from parties close to Moscow)
– Disinformation exposure (use of alternative media and belief in conspiracies)
Key findings
1) Partisan alignment is the strongest predictor
The single best predictor of sympathy for Russia is how close a respondent’s preferred party is to the Kremlin. Using expert assessments of party proximity, supporters of parties with pro‑Kremlin stances are much more likely to favour Russia in the conflict. The data suggest a top‑down dynamic: many people appear to adopt their party’s framing rather than holding deeply formed personal beliefs about the war.
2) Disinformation and alternative media matter a great deal
The second‑strongest correlate is reliance on non‑traditional news sources and susceptibility to conspiracy narratives. People who mainly get political news from social media or messaging apps and who endorse conspiratorial explanations (for example that the COVID‑19 pandemic was orchestrated) are significantly less likely to want Ukraine to prevail. In one comparison, such respondents were about 40% less likely to prefer a Ukrainian victory than those who relied on traditional media and rejected conspiracy claims.
3) Ideology plays a smaller role
Cultural conservatism and authoritarian orientations (preference for strong leaders, skepticism about minority rights) are associated with greater sympathy for the Kremlin, but their effect is weaker than partisan alignment and disinformation exposure.
4) Economic pain is not a major driver
Contrary to fears that rising energy prices and economic hardship after the invasion would push citizens toward Russia, reported individual suffering during the energy crisis does not predict greater pro‑Kremlin sentiment. Economic grievance appears to be a minor factor, if any.
Interpretation
The pattern points to information and political signaling as the main engines of pro‑Russian attitudes in Europe. Where political elites and parties either promote pro‑Kremlin narratives or tolerate alternative information ecosystems that spread them, public opinion tends to follow. This suggests many sympathies for Russia are less about material self‑interest or deep ideological affinity and more about the messages people receive through party networks and media channels.
Policy implications
If partisan cues and disinformation drive a sizeable share of pro‑Russian views, then efforts to reduce Kremlin influence must focus on the information environment and elite behavior. This includes moderating harmful misinformation on digital platforms, supporting independent traditional media, promoting media literacy, and—crucially—political leadership that refuses to amplify hostile narratives.
Domestic politics constrain these responses. In some countries, ruling parties or prominent leaders have rolled back anti‑disinformation measures or echoed pro‑Russian talking points, which makes changing public attitudes difficult. Strengthening resilience therefore depends not only on technical fixes to the information ecosystem but also on political incentives that reward defending, rather than undermining, information integrity.
Conclusion
Across 18 European countries and tens of thousands of respondents, the clearest drivers of pro‑Russian sentiment are partisan alignment with pro‑Kremlin parties and exposure to disinformation, with ideology playing a smaller role and economic hardship having little effect. Addressing these attitudes requires both robust efforts to counter misinformation and political leadership committed to truthful public discourse.
