When the US renamed Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis acknowledged a simple truth: the Indian and Pacific Oceans are connected and require a unified strategy. That decision rightly broadened US thinking beyond the South China Sea and East Asia, but successive US initiatives have still tended to concentrate on the eastern Indian Ocean where Chinese coercion is most visible.
That narrower focus risks missing a vital front. Beijing’s ambitions are not confined to the South China Sea or the Bay of Bengal. China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in August 2017, a few miles from Camp Lemonnier, the hub for US Africa Command operations in the Horn of Africa. A permanent PLAN presence there gives China logistical reach across the full Indian Ocean basin — from its South Sea Fleet in southern China to the Red Sea and western Indian Ocean via Djibouti.
China’s expanding military and commercial footprint is reinforced by political access: Cambodia’s willingness to open the Ream Naval Base, closer ties with island states such as Mauritius, and growing influence in East African capitals. Those developments make Western policy choices elsewhere more consequential. For example, the British decision to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius has surprised many strategic analysts, especially given the centrality of the US-UK facility on Diego Garcia to regional operations. If Mauritius moves closer to Beijing, the security of that base could be called into question.
US strategy documents have made rhetorical commitments to a free and open Indo-Pacific, and administrations have sought greater Indian engagement. The November 2025 National Security Strategy urged India to play a more active role and emphasized freedom of navigation. Yet the same document treated Red Sea and western Indian Ocean security largely as an adjunct to Middle Eastern concerns, undercutting an appreciation that maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is inseparable from African states’ politics and stability.
The Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy, released on Jan. 23, also underscores the problem: excessive emphasis on China and the broader Indo-Pacific construct, while giving scant attention to Africa and barely mentioning India. If the United States hopes to preserve a balance of power in the Indian Ocean, rhetorical commitments and East-centric frameworks alone will not suffice.
Washington needs partners who will contest Chinese influence across the basin. New Delhi faces a clear choice: either compete with Beijing for influence in the western Indian Ocean on its own, or coordinate closely with the United States and like-minded partners. India has already taken steps — commissioning assets in the Lakshadweep and increasing deployments — but it must go further if it intends to deny China uncontested access to strategic littorals.
Practical steps India could take include strengthening ties and presence in the island states and East African ports: expanding infrastructure and security cooperation in Agalega, deepening engagement with Mauritius beyond commercial ties, and exploring permanent facilities or logistics arrangements in northern Madagascar, Zanzibar, or Mombasa. An Indian naval logistics footprint in East Africa would not only raise the costs to China, but also generate follow-on economic ties, development projects, and soft-power gains that reinforce strategic partnerships.
Cooperation between the United States and India can be mutually reinforcing. A division of labor — the US focusing more on inland African security and New Delhi concentrating on coastal security and maritime infrastructure — would align capabilities and interests. The two democracies could coordinate investment in ports, maritime domain awareness, and local capacity-building to offer alternatives to Chinese credit and infrastructure deals.
Recognition and diplomatic posture also matter. India’s hesitation to recognize Somaliland is a missed opportunity from a strategic perspective. Somaliland has functioned independently for decades and could offer a secure partner on the Horn’s littoral. India’s longstanding ties with Somalia are important, but a limited diplomatic reappraisal of Somaliland, coordinated with partners, would signal that New Delhi is prepared to defend its maritime interests across the basin.
Elsewhere, Mozambique offers another test case. Northern Cabo Delgado, once a focal point for Islamist insurgency, is gas-rich and sits on a valuable deep-water harbor at Pemba. India, with historical ties to Maputo and growing energy interests, could be a constructive investor and security partner to develop the region responsibly, linking economic development to stabilization.
Economic stakes underscore the strategic imperative. Africa’s resources — from the Democratic Republic of Congo’s vast mineral endowment to rare earths and hydrocarbons across the coast — are central to global supply chains. Allowing China to consolidate preferential access through exclusive investment and political influence would undercut both Washington’s and New Delhi’s long-term industrial and security interests.
Policy choices are stark: the US can pursue a largely rhetorical Indo-Pacific strategy focused eastward, or it can broaden its strategic aperture to the western Indian Ocean and African littorals and repair frayed ties with key partners, especially India. If Washington opts for partnership, it must enter explicit discussions with New Delhi about roles, bases, recognition of strategic partners, and coordinated investments in security and development.
Chinese presence in Djibouti and expanding influence across the Indian Ocean make clear that security in this theater will not be decided solely by what happens in the South China Sea. The United States, India, and their allies must recognize Africa’s centrality to Indian Ocean strategy and act accordingly — through diplomacy, investment, and a calibrated military footprint that reflects the basin’s full geography and political realities.
