Last summer a Department of Energy meeting at Idaho National Laboratory illustrated a sweeping shift in how the U.S. government is approaching nuclear regulation. The session was led by Seth Cohen, a 31‑year‑old lawyer recently assigned from a White House efficiency team, who had little background in nuclear policy. When career staff raised concerns about radiation exposure at test sites, Cohen reportedly dismissed them with a remark about the small population in Utah. Many longtime regulators found the tone flippant and alarming.
The scene captured a broader effort to remake regulation so it speeds reactor approvals and favors a new generation of small advanced reactors backed by venture capital. Over the last several years, officials aligned with the administration — including political operatives and startup investors — have pushed to rewrite thousands of pages of safety rules quickly and to steer decisions that historically were the domain of the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
That pressure on the NRC has been unusually aggressive. President Trump fired Commissioner Christopher Hanson after Hanson emphasized the agency’s independent role; it was the first such firing in NRC history. DOE staff were told to “assume the NRC is going to do whatever we tell the NRC to do,” according to records. The message: align the regulator with a White House agenda to speed construction and scale of new reactors.
The result has been significant turnover. Analysis of NRC and federal personnel data shows hundreds of departures since these changes began, particularly among veteran reactor and materials safety staff. Hiring has slowed, leaving fewer experts to replace retirees and resignations. Many career employees say the agency’s independence and safety culture are strained; former NRC officials warn the culture that has long supported U.S. nuclear safety is under threat.
Political and financial forces driving deregulation include conservative deregulatory advocates and influential Silicon Valley investors such as Peter Thiel and Marc Andreessen, who have backed nuclear startups and advised on personnel choices. The administration has signed executive orders to accelerate nuclear build‑out, directed the NRC to shorten approval timelines and reduce workforce, and asked DOE to create pathways for testing “advanced” reactors. Advocates frame these moves as necessary to expand nuclear output and supply new demand — for example, power-hungry AI data centers.
Some of the deregulatory groundwork predates the current administration. The 2024 ADVANCE Act altered mission language to discourage overly restrictive limits on nuclear development. The present team, however, has taken those impulses further: vetting prospective political appointees through investor networks, routing draft rules to companies for comment before public release, and embedding political lawyers into the NRC.
At DOE the changes are dramatic. About a third of the department’s nuclear office staff left by early 2026, according to watchdog analyses. DOE set up “concierge” teams to shepherd selected projects through permitting, shared draft regulations with participating companies, and publicly promoted a business case for loosening radiation protections to reduce costs — including proposals that could raise allowable public exposure levels severalfold and reduce shielding requirements nationwide if adopted by the NRC.
Officials have discussed abandoning long‑standing safety practices such as the ALARA principle (“As Low As Reasonably Achievable”), and internal documents — some compiled with assistance from AI tools — have been used to justify regulatory changes. Radiation experts say the science on some proposed relaxations is contested and that raising dose limits could put the U.S. out of step with international norms.
Venture‑backed startups exert visible cultural influence. DOE and administration visitors have appeared alongside investors and company founders in meetings with regulators. In one reported incident, a startup founder’s hats were handed out during a visit to the NRC, prompting ethics concerns among career staff. Several startups have pursued legal strategies aimed at reducing federal oversight or shifting authority to states, and some have sought settlements or compromises career regulators expected courts would reject.
The injection of political and corporate influence has prompted resignations and a climate in which employees say they hesitate to raise issues that might displease political leadership. One NRC official likened the workplace to “a lobster in a slowly boiling pot,” describing a gradual erosion of morale and a sense that speed is being prioritized over long‑tested safety norms.
Even supporters of nuclear expansion caution that rapid, politically driven deregulation could backfire by undermining public trust. Pro‑nuclear groups urge protecting the NRC’s independence to maintain credibility. Proponents argue that many existing rules were written for large light‑water reactors and may not fit smaller advanced designs; they contend that new sensors, modeling and automation could justify modernized standards and faster licensing. Critics counter that historical disasters such as Fukushima and Chernobyl highlighted how regulatory capture and cozy industry‑regulator ties can contribute to catastrophe, and they stress the value of a rigorous, independent regulator that has helped prevent major incidents in the U.S. for decades.
Draft NRC rule changes circulating in 2026 proposed significant cuts to inspections and emergency preparedness activities, including large reductions in inspection time for some programs. Leadership turnovers, retirements and the placement of political operatives into senior roles have further unsettled staff. Some commissioners and career lawyers have publicly warned that resistance to safety‑compromising changes could lead to firings — and in at least one case lawyers withdrew from a licensing board hearing citing limited resources, an unusual development.
Seth Cohen and allies frame their work as removing government barriers so industry can scale quickly, sometimes invoking geopolitical or economic urgency tied to AI competitiveness. They have pushed to avoid costly trust funds for workplace accidents, tolerated the possibility of rare but catastrophic “100‑year events,” and compared startup risk to the early, failure‑prone years of the commercial space industry.
DOE and White House spokespeople insist they remain committed to safety and say new rules aim to reflect up‑to‑date science while cutting needless bureaucracy. Still, many career experts, independent scientists and some industry proponents worry the rapid pace and political direction of reform could erode safety culture, public trust and the long‑term viability of nuclear power. Given the potentially high stakes of a serious incident, those concerns carry weight beyond industry debates about speed and innovation.

