India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) after the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 civilians has reignited debates over water security, sovereignty and long-term strategy. In a strongly worded essay in Saviours Magazine, former bureaucrat KBS Sindhu urges New Delhi to convert the suspension from a political signal into a durable hydrological and geopolitical advantage.
Sindhu frames the 1960 treaty as an act of generosity rooted in assumptions of mutual goodwill that no longer reflect regional realities. He notes the treaty—brokered by the World Bank and signed by India’s then-leadership and Pakistan—allocated the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) primarily to India and gave Pakistan dominant use of the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab). He argues this settlement, while historically important, left Pakistan with nearly 80 percent of basin flows and constrained India’s options as the upper-riparian state.
Legally, Sindhu contends India can justify moving the treaty into abeyance under doctrines that recognise fundamental changes in circumstances, pointing to decades of cross-border terrorism as a material shift. Beyond that legal claim, he criticises India’s own failure to fully use the rights the treaty allows. Long delays on projects such as Ranjit Sagar and Shahpur Kandi, he says, have meant significant volumes of India’s share—roughly 0.6 million acre-feet a year from the Ravi—have flowed unused into Pakistan even as groundwater in Punjab plummets.
On the western rivers, treaty provisions permit substantial storage and hydropower development; Sindhu notes India has realised only a small portion of the permitted storage capacity (up to 3.6 million acre-feet) and left some 18 gigawatts of hydropower potential largely untapped. He accuses Pakistan of using the treaty’s dispute mechanisms—objections and arbitration—to block Indian projects and delay implementation.
Sindhu places India’s move in an international context where states increasingly prioritise survival and strategic interest over strict treaty text. He warns that unless India converts diplomatic leverage into actual water infrastructure and capacity, threats will amount to little more than rhetoric.
A central policy concern is Punjab’s acute water stress. Heavy groundwater extraction is outpacing recharge, producing agricultural, economic and social risks in a sensitive border state. Sindhu cautions that a severely depleted Punjab could become unstable, linking water scarcity to broader security challenges.
To build resilience, he proposes an ambitious infrastructure agenda: a Chenab–Ravi diversion via the Marhu Tunnel; rapid construction of storage projects such as Bursar and Sawalkot; and inter-basin transfers linking the Jhelum and Beas. These initiatives, he argues, should be treated as national security priorities, financed centrally and fast-tracked through clearances. The core principle is that leverage depends on capacity—only tangible projects will translate political signals into strategic reality.
Sindhu also suggests water can become a bargaining chip in future negotiations with Pakistan. As Pakistan faces growing demand pressures from population growth and climate change, any new settlement should be conditional on verifiable steps against terrorism, he argues.
Institutional reforms are part of the prescription: creation of a National Indus Basin Authority with legislative backing to oversee planning and execution, cut bureaucratic delays and coordinate inter-state and inter-agency action.
For Sindhu, suspending the treaty is not an endpoint but a reset. The challenge, he writes, is to turn a political gesture into lasting hydrological capability and then into strategic leverage—linking water policy, national security and development in the Indus basin’s future.
