When the United States broadened Pacific Command to Indo‑Pacific Command in 2018, leaders warned that China’s strategic competition reaches far beyond the South China Sea. US doctrine and initiatives such as the Quad and AUKUS reflect that wider framing, but in practice much attention has focused on the eastern Indian Ocean. The western Indian Ocean and Africa’s littoral states—where Beijing’s footprint is growing—have been relatively neglected, and that gap risks shifting the strategic balance.
China’s base in Djibouti, opened in 2017 near the US base at Camp Lemonnier, marked a new phase: a permanent PLAN presence giving Beijing access across the Indian Ocean from China’s southern fleets to the Red Sea. Chinese influence is also expanding through arrangements such as access to Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base and closer ties with island states like Mauritius. Those connections, combined with other economic and diplomatic levers, make the western basin an arena for long‑term competition.
Recent developments complicate existing Western military arrangements. The British decision to transfer the Chagos archipelago back to Mauritius raises questions about the future of the US–UK presence on Diego Garcia and illustrates how historical and political decisions can produce strategic uncertainty. If China deepens influence in Mauritius or other island states, the central Indian Ocean could become contested in ways neither Washington nor New Delhi expects.
Official US strategy signals have been uneven. While the 2025 National Security Strategy reaffirmed the goal of a free and open Indo‑Pacific, it framed Red Sea navigation mainly as a Middle East concern and treated African states largely through counterterrorism lenses. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes China repeatedly but tends to sideline Africa. Without explicit, sustained policy toward African partners, the US risks ceding strategic space to Beijing.
India faces parallel choices. To prevent China from consolidating influence in the western Indian Ocean, New Delhi must be active there or coordinate closely with Washington. Competition with Beijing will play out not only in Mauritius and South Africa but also along East Africa’s coast—from Kenya and Tanzania to island territories. India’s deployments to Lakshadweep and Agalega indicate interest, but a larger, more systematic footprint is required to shape outcomes.
Concrete options for India include expanding presence on Agalega and in northern Madagascar, and establishing a permanent naval facility in a major East African port such as Mombasa or Zanzibar. Those posts would increase the operational cost for any adversary seeking to project power, while also serving as hubs for Indian investment, trade, and soft‑power engagement. A security posture that catalyzes commercial ties and development can be an engine of influence rather than merely a show of force.
Washington and New Delhi can divide effort to exploit their comparative advantages. The US could prioritize inland engagement, diplomatic and economic partnerships, and broader regional security architecture, while India focuses on littoral and maritime relationships, port development, and coastal security cooperation. Coordinated policies could link US interior investments—such as mining and infrastructure projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo—with Indian coastal logistics and trade routes, providing alternatives to Chinese economic dependency.
Recognition and diplomatic choices matter as well. India’s past reluctance to engage Somaliland—citing Somali sovereignty—stands in contrast to precedents where New Delhi adapted recognition policy to new realities. If India, perhaps in partnership with the US, signaled a willingness to engage or recognize strategic partners in the Horn of Africa, it would demonstrate commitment to protecting its interests across the basin and force Beijing to reconsider assumptions about uncontested influence. Joint naval operations supported by nearby air infrastructure would build interoperability and deterrence without necessarily escalating confrontation.
Other opportunities exist along the African coast. Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province, despite recent instability, sits next to gas reserves and a deep‑water port at Pemba. Indian investment, technical assistance, and development‑focused partnerships could help stabilize the region, accelerate local benefits from resource development, and undercut Chinese economic leverage.
Words in US strategy documents are insufficient by themselves. A narrow Indo‑Pacific approach that effectively excludes the western sea lanes and African littoral states will not reverse Chinese gains. If Washington chooses to deepen partnership with India, the two must agree on a clear division of labor: who leads engagement with specific littoral states, whether to reconsider recognition policy in strategic cases, and where new facilities or partnerships are needed.
China is already established in Djibouti; securing the Indian Ocean will require attention to the whole basin, including Africa’s coast. Without a coordinated and sustained US‑Indian approach in the western Indian Ocean, Beijing’s maritime presence and political influence will continue to grow.
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
