Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a powerful paramilitary institution embedded in the country’s theocratic system. Reporting directly to the Supreme Leader, it controls Iran’s ballistic missiles and a growing drone arsenal, and conducts operations both inside and beyond Iran’s borders.
Origins and growth
The IRGC was created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend the clerical government and was later written into Iran’s constitution. It developed alongside the conventional military and expanded its influence during the 1980–88 Iran‑Iraq war. After the war, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei granted the corps greater authority to enter business and infrastructure projects, enabling further institutional growth.
Economic reach
Over time the IRGC built extensive economic interests. It oversees major construction and engineering firms such as Khatam al‑Anbia and has stakes in road and port projects, telecommunications and even some medical services. These commercial activities have increased its financial resources and political clout.
Overseas operations and the Quds Force
A key component of the IRGC’s power is the Quds Force, its expeditionary arm that supports allied militias and governments across the region. The Quds Force has backed Bashar al‑Assad in Syria, supported Hezbollah in Lebanon, aided Houthi forces in Yemen and helped Iranian‑aligned groups in Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion. U.S. officials have accused the IRGC of training Iraqi militants in producing and deploying deadly roadside bombs.
Intelligence, covert action and detentions
The IRGC runs its own intelligence networks and has been linked to operations targeting dissidents and opponents overseas, including alleged use of criminal networks and agents. It has overseen arrests and secretive trials of dual nationals and people with Western ties; Western governments say some detainees are used as bargaining chips in diplomatic negotiations. Iran denies responsibility for many allegations of foreign plots.
Strains from the Israel war
The IRGC’s regional network has been tested since the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the Gaza war that followed. Iran has supported Hamas, and Israel’s campaign has attacked not only Hamas in Gaza but also Iranian‑backed forces elsewhere, striking Hezbollah and repeatedly hitting Houthi positions. The December 2024 fall of Syria’s Assad government removed a significant regional partner for Tehran and the IRGC, intensifying strategic tensions.
Escalation and hits on IRGC targets
Iran and Israel have exchanged strikes, with operations coordinated in part by the IRGC. In June, Israeli air operations struck IRGC targets, killing senior commanders and damaging missile sites, launchers and Guard‑operated air defenses, disrupting aspects of its command and capabilities.
Domestic role and crackdowns
At home, the IRGC relies on the Basij volunteer militia to help suppress dissent. Since protests began on Dec. 28, Basij units have been filmed using long guns, batons and pellet guns against demonstrators and pursuing protesters in the streets. Senior Basij figures have called for members to mobilize to quash unrest. Citing its role in violent crackdowns, the European Union designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization in January.
Command, autonomy and strategic leverage
Questions about command and coordination have arisen as attacks on Gulf Arab states have continued, including strikes on countries that have acted as intermediaries with Tehran. Iran’s foreign minister has suggested some military elements may act with a degree of independence within broad prior instructions, a claim interpreted by some observers as contingency planning or a diplomatic signal to regional partners. The IRGC remains unique in Iran’s power structure because it controls much of the country’s missile stockpile and weaponized drones, giving it substantial autonomy and leverage within the state.
