Israel has increasingly used airstrikes to eliminate senior Iranian figures as part of a broader effort to weaken the Islamic Republic. But analysts say past experience with decapitation campaigns — against militant groups and, more rarely, states — shows the tactic has important limits and can produce unintended consequences.
Targeted killings can yield short-term, tangible results that governments portray as victories. Yet they rarely resolve the political grievances or structural problems that sustain conflict. Jon Alterman, chair of Global Security and Geostrategy at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, notes that the effects of removing leaders often fade because regimes rest on overlapping institutions and networks that survive punitive strikes.
The conflict has already produced high-profile losses. Israel has killed Hezbollah figures, including leader Hassan Nasrallah, and struck senior Hamas commanders. Despite those decapitations, Hezbollah continued rocket and missile attacks after suffering heavy losses, and Hamas still exerts control over large parts of Gaza. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard likewise kept launching missile salvos at Israel and Gulf targets and effectively disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz even after key commanders were killed or driven underground.
History offers mixed lessons. Israel’s 1992 killing of Hezbollah leader Abbas Musawi helped elevate a charismatic replacement, Hassan Nasrallah, who then expanded the group’s capabilities and led it through a destructive 2006 war with Israel. Israel’s strikes in 2024 removed Nasrallah and many deputies, yet Hezbollah renewed attacks within days.
The United States’ targeted killings of extremist leaders — Osama bin Laden in 2011 and Islamic State founder Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi in 2019 — degraded those groups but came as part of much larger, long-running military campaigns that included significant ground operations. Removing a leader does not automatically end an organization’s ability to operate.
Assassinating or toppling state leaders has often produced instability rather than stable, favorable outcomes. The 1961 overthrow and murder of Congo’s Patrice Lumumba, linked to foreign involvement, preceded decades of authoritarianism and civil conflict. NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya and the killing of Moammar Gadhafi were followed by prolonged fragmentation and violence. The 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein dismantled Iraqi institutions and helped plunge the country into turmoil.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has portrayed decapitation strikes against Iran as a way to weaken the regime and encourage internal change that might produce a more friendly government. So far, there has been no sign of the kind of uprising that would topple Tehran; Iranian authorities have suppressed protests and the state apparatus has remained largely intact. Some US political figures have suggested the war might elevate more moderate Iranian figures, but analysts warn the opposite is possible — leadership removal could empower harder-line successors or trigger chaotic collapse.
Former Israeli intelligence official Yossi Kuperwasser says targeted killings can be a useful instrument to weaken enemies and reshape leadership structures, but they are not a panacea. A senior Israeli intelligence source told The Associated Press that decapitation strikes had hampered political leaders’ ability to issue orders and make decisions. Still, removing individuals does not automatically eliminate an organization’s capacity to inflict harm.
That risk is underscored by research showing that violence against civilians often rises after targeted killings. Northeastern University political scientist Max Abrahms argues that eliminating leaders who favored some restraint can leave more extreme figures in charge, increasing the likelihood of harsher tactics and reprisals. Slain leaders can also become powerful martyrs, sustaining movements even after their deaths.
Analysts emphasize that targeted killings only create opportunities for change if they are paired with a coherent political strategy. Mohanad Hage Ali of the Carnegie Middle East Centre says military decapitation or defeat must be followed by political follow-through; without it, leadership removal rarely produces lasting resolution.
In short, while decapitation strikes can degrade command structures and provide short-term gains, experts warn they can also radicalize opponents, elevate more extreme successors, create dangerous vacuums, or leave the underlying conflicts untouched. The ultimate outcome depends less on the removal of individuals than on whether those actions are part of a broader, politically informed plan to address the causes of violence and instability.
