Images of floating mines, fast Iranian speedboats firing on merchant ships, and U.S. warships caught between them bring to mind the 1980s “Tanker War” more than today’s pause in open hostilities. In that era, Iran and Iraq targeted shipping during their war; the United States responded by escorting Kuwaiti tankers to keep oil moving. Could Washington mount a similar operation now?
The short answer is: possible, but far more difficult. The Strait of Hormuz remains a strategic choke point—roughly 20 percent of traded oil and natural gas moved through it in peacetime—so the incentive to protect traffic is real. The U.S. has already provided limited escorts in other theaters (notably in the Red Sea against Houthi attacks), and senior U.S. officials have signaled a willingness to use force against small Iranian vessels when they threaten ships. Still, repeating the Earnest Will model would face significant operational and political hurdles.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has long used small, fast boats—often civilian hulls armed with heavy machine guns, rockets and now drones—to shadow, harass and, at times, seize vessels. This past week’s seizure of two cargo ships demonstrated how limited forces can disrupt transit and leverage global economic anxiety, even while Iranian coasts face naval pressure.
The original convoy operation grew from the Iraq–Iran war. Iraq struck oil infrastructure and tankers; Iran mined waters and attacked vessels in retaliation. The U.S. response included reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti tankers. That mission was dangerous: the reflagged tanker Bridgeton hit a mine while under escort; USS Stark was struck by an Iraqi missile with heavy loss of life; USS Samuel B. Roberts was badly damaged by a mine; and the U.S. downed Iran Air Flight 655, with catastrophic civilian deaths. Despite this, the Navy escorted roughly 70 convoys through the region.
Today’s environment is more complex. Advances in asymmetric weapons—cheap, precise cruise and anti-ship missiles, expendable drones, and swarm-boat tactics—make sealing a maritime corridor far harder. A single successful strike from a missile, drone or boat could immediately erode the reassurance an escort force is meant to provide. That technological reality helps explain why many European countries have been reluctant to participate in escort operations absent a wider settlement.
Policy aims have also shifted. In the 1980s the objective was narrowly defined: keep the strait open. Contemporary U.S. goals are less focused and sometimes framed in maximalist or regime-change terms, complicating decisions about risk and commitment. In the Red Sea, U.S. escorts were limited by flag and cargo; ships there saw some of the fiercest surface combat in decades. A decision to impose a protective cordon in Hormuz could prompt similar, severe clashes.
Whether today’s U.S. administration wants that level of confrontation—or believes it can effectively secure the strait against modern asymmetric threats—remains unclear. The practical obstacles and geopolitical risks mean that, while escorts are an available tool, repeating the Tanker War model in full would be a far tougher and more dangerous undertaking now than in the 1980s.
