During his Pacific tour, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka signed a new defence agreement called the Ocean of Peace Alliance, or the Veitacini Treaty. The pact is part of a recent Australian push to formalize closer security ties across the region — following treaties or agreements with Tuvalu (Falepili Union, 2023), Nauru (2024), Papua New Guinea (Pukpuk Treaty, 2025) and Vanuatu (Nakamal Agreement, 2026) — and comes as leaders in the Pacific contemplate further bilateral arrangements with the Solomon Islands and potentially Tonga.
Within hours of the Australia–Fiji signing, China conducted a long‑range ballistic missile test over the Pacific. The test drew criticism from regional leaders and highlighted how military signalling in the region can sharpen questions about security alignments and the risks these alignments carry.
What the treaty actually says
The Veitacini Treaty contains a mutual security commitment but, like many alliances in this region, the guarantee is qualified. Article 6 commits each party to “act to meet the common danger” of an armed attack in the Pacific, but specifically conditions that response on each country’s domestic processes. That qualification makes the undertaking far less automatic or enforceable than commitments in treaties such as NATO’s Article 5, where an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all and triggers collective defence measures.
In practical terms the Veitacini Treaty is mainly symbolic. Australia itself relies heavily on the US for defence and would find it difficult to defend Fiji on its own. The treaty is nevertheless deliberate diplomacy: it signals shared concern about China’s growing strategic interest in the region and shows Fiji is aligning — at least in part — with Canberra. Rabuka’s repeated assurances that the pact is not directed at Beijing are themselves an indication of how the agreement will be read by outside observers.
Regional implications and the questions they raise
1) Will the pact militarize the Pacific?
The treaty allows other Pacific Island countries to apply to join if they can “further its purposes and principles.” That presumes the capacity for meaningful military cooperation: interoperability, forces able to participate in combined exercises, and the resources to sustain defence capabilities. Few Pacific states have standing militaries (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga and New Zealand are exceptions), so this could create a two‑tier security architecture: deeper mutual‑defence relationships for countries with militaries, and lesser forms of cooperation for those without. The result could push some states toward building defence forces to avoid being sidelined in regional security discussions — a costly and potentially destabilizing dynamic that may increase dependence on Australia for training, equipment and support.
2) How does the pact fit with the Pacific’s own institutions and visions?
The treaty borrows the “Ocean of Peace” branding also used in the Pacific Islands Forum’s Blue Pacific declaration, a regionally endorsed vision. That raises questions about who speaks for that concept: the Forum as a multilateral body or a bilateral Australia–Fiji arrangement. With the Forum Secretariat based in Suva and Fiji proposing an Ocean of Peace Centre under the accompanying Vuvale Union, concerns that regionalism is becoming Suva‑centric could be reinforced — a perennial complaint among Micronesian members and others who worry about uneven influence across the Pacific.
3) Has Fiji shifted from “friends to all, enemies to none”?
Fiji’s 2025 National Security Strategy restated a policy of not choosing sides. But a mutual‑defence treaty, even a qualified one, is inherently about defending against threats from other states. Pacific leaders have consistently rejected framing regional choices as between China and traditional partners; a defence pact suggests a tougher posture and could be perceived as selecting sides.
Questions for Fiji
1) What will implementation cost?
Effective alliance ties require sustained exercises, compatible equipment, interoperable command arrangements and ongoing training — all expensive. Fiji will likely need external assistance to meet those standards. There is also the political risk of alliance “entrapment”: once bound by mutual defence expectations, a country may feel pressured to support an ally’s military response even when it would otherwise abstain, potentially drawing Fiji into broader conflicts.
2) How does the Veitacini Treaty interact with ANZUS and other alliances?
Australia sits in multiple defence relationships, notably ANZUS with the United States and New Zealand. Overlap raises thorny questions about obligations if, for example, Australia were involved in a conflict linked to US facilities or interests in the Pacific. Could such scenarios draw Fiji in, or make Fiji a strategic target? China’s ballistic missile test served as an uncomfortable reminder of the kinds of risks that can accompany heightened strategic posturing.
3) How transparent will the alliance be in practice?
The treaty envisions governance by consultation mechanisms yet to be detailed. Past bilateral security pacts Canberra has concluded with Pacific states have proceeded with limited public oversight. There is scant publicly available evaluation of whether previous agreements, such as the Vuvale partnership, delivered on their promises. Openness about implementation, costs, and the objectives of joint activities will be crucial if the alliance is to win public trust.
Broader assessment of Australia’s approach
Australia’s concerns about China’s role and influence in the Pacific are legitimate. But the recent flurry of treaty announcements has drawn criticism as reactive and sometimes superficial — a “sugar‑rush” approach that prefers public declarations to thorough consultation and careful planning. If these new arrangements are to genuinely enhance regional security, they need transparent implementation, rigorous cost assessments, clear coordination with existing regional institutions (especially the Pacific Islands Forum), and a willingness by Australia to defer to Pacific priorities rather than simply shape them.
One definite outcome of these developments is increased scrutiny. Pacific governments and populations will watch how Australia behaves: whether it acts with genuine partnership, respects regional institutions, and helps build resilient, inclusive security frameworks — or whether its actions look like a great‑power attempt to consolidate influence. The missile test by China that followed the Fiji signing was a blunt reminder that military signalling in the Pacific has consequences. Whether the Veitacini Treaty produces security, division, or both will depend on how transparently and responsibly it is implemented, and whether it complements — rather than supplants — regional leadership and cooperation.
