The Cuban Communist Party has survived more than six decades in power despite a long-running U.S. embargo and the severe shortages of the post-Soviet “special period.” External hostility and internal crises have repeatedly tested the government, but the current emergency looks among the most serious yet.
The shock stems from what amounts to a naval squeeze by the Trump administration as it presses for regime change after the removal of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro. President Trump has said he expects to “have the honour of taking Cuba” soon, and U.S. officials are reportedly pursuing Díaz-Canel’s ouster in talks with Havana that may aim to avoid direct military action.
Without declaring a formal blockade, White House measures have already gutted trade with the island. Maritime intelligence firm Windward found that in March deliveries of oil, food and other supplies to Cuba almost stopped: no foreign-originating tankers arrived, and port calls that had averaged roughly 50 per month in 2025 plunged to just 11 in March, all from domestic ports — the lowest monthly total since 2017.
There is little sign of relief. No tankers currently list Cuba as a destination, and only three container ships — reported to originate from China, India and the Netherlands — show Cuba as a planned port of call, though itineraries can change.
The chokehold is inflicting real hardship on Cuba’s 11 million people. Widespread blackouts and a collapse in medical services have been reported as fuel shortages leave ambulances and hospital generators without power. Cuba relies heavily on imported oil for electricity and produces only about 40 percent of its own needs.
Ian Ralby, who runs the U.S.-based maritime security firm I.R. Consilium, warned that Washington’s hardline posture is unlikely to win the hearts of Cubans who want change. “Every Cuban resident is suffering the acute inaccessibility to fuel and all the knock-on consequences in terms of access to food, hospitals and free movement,” he said.
The abrupt trade halt has happened even though Washington has not formally reimposed the export restrictions relaxed under the Biden administration. In the past year, U.S. shipments of poultry, pork and other foodstuffs — which make up the bulk of U.S. exports to Cuba — rose to about $490 million, the highest level since 2009, and non‑agricultural exports and humanitarian donations to the island’s growing private sector more than doubled.
Emboldened by the operation that ousted Maduro, the president has escalated rhetoric toward Cuba, at times promising a “friendly takeover” and telling conservative Latin American allies he would “take care” of Cuba once the conflict with Iran subsides. The administration has not defined what those vows mean, but the visible presence of U.S. warships tied to the Venezuela action has prompted companies and countries that trade with Cuba to restrict themselves to avoid U.S. scrutiny.
“Nobody wants to be on the radar of Trump’s Truth Social account,” said John Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.
Ahead of the operation that removed Maduro on January 3, the U.S. announced it would block Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba and seized some tankers to enforce a so-called “quarantine,” language that echoed President John F. Kennedy’s 1962 rhetoric. In late January, the president signed an executive order threatening tariffs on any nation that supplies oil to Cuba, alarming Mexican officials; Mexico’s state oil company, Pemex, had been a key supplier as Venezuelan flows declined.
Havana calls the measures a “fuel blockade.” The U.S. rejects that label, mindful that international law treats naval actions that punish civilians as unlawful aggression outside declared wartime.
“Cuba is a free, independent and sovereign state—nobody dictates what we do,” President Miguel Díaz-Canel wrote on social media in January. “Cuba does not attack; we are the victims of U.S. attacks for 66 years and we will prepare ourselves to defend the homeland with our last drop of blood.”
Facing growing criticism that U.S. actions are harming civilians, the administration has offered limited concessions and softened some messaging. Senior U.S. officials, including voices in Congress, have signaled a less confrontational tone, and in January the State Department sent about $3 million in food kits, water purification tablets and other humanitarian supplies to the island. Last month the White House said it would allow U.S. firms to send fuel, including Venezuelan oil, to private Cuban businesses.
For now, however, the immediate effect of Washington’s campaign is a crippling squeeze on supplies and growing suffering among ordinary Cubans, even as political pressure on Havana increases.
