In 2018, the US renamed Pacific Command to Indo‑Pacific Command to acknowledge that strategic competition with China spans both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. US doctrine and partnerships such as the Quad and AUKUS reflect that wider frame, yet much of the operational emphasis has gravitated toward the eastern Indian Ocean where Chinese activity is most conspicuous. That focus, however, risks missing Beijing’s pan‑regional ambitions.
China has already secured a foothold in the western Indian Ocean. The People’s Liberation Army opened its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017, located near the US facility at Camp Lemonnier. That logistics hub enables Chinese naval operations across the basin—from the South Sea Fleet to the Red Sea—and, combined with access at sites like Cambodia’s Ream and growing ties with island states such as Mauritius, extends Beijing’s reach toward Africa’s littoral.
Recent moves in Europe add another layer of complexity. The British decision to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius raises questions about the future of the US‑UK base on Diego Garcia and illustrates how far‑away political choices can reshape security calculations in the western Indian Ocean—especially if China deepens ties with Mauritius despite India’s presence on Agalega.
US strategy documents have so far underweighted this theater. The 2025 US National Security Strategy endorses a free and open Indo‑Pacific and calls on India to be more proactive, yet it treats Red Sea navigation and the western Indian Ocean largely through a Middle East lens. The 2026 National Defense Strategy repeatedly names China but largely sidelines Africa, defaulting to a narrow counterterrorism framing. Without a sustained, integrated approach that includes Africa’s coastal states, Washington risks ceding influence and balance in a strategically vital basin.
This is where stronger US‑India coordination matters. New Delhi faces a choice: compete with Beijing on its own terms in the western Indian Ocean or build a robust, coordinated posture with Washington and other partners. India has taken initial steps—such as commissioning INS Jatayu at Lakshadweep—but it should broaden its maritime footprint. A sustained Indian presence near Agalega, and expanded deployments or facilities in northern Madagascar, Zanzibar, or Mombasa, would increase the operational cost for China while generating economic and diplomatic returns for India, not merely military leverage.
Economic competition is part of the picture. The Democratic Republic of Congo and other African states possess vast mineral and rare earth deposits that will matter to future technological and defense supply chains. The United States and India should contest Chinese access to such resources through coordinated diplomacy, investment, and development assistance. A practical division of labor—where the US leans into partnerships in continental interiors and India focuses on coastal and maritime engagement—could align security, trade, and development objectives efficiently.
Diplomacy must accompany military and economic policies. India’s reluctance to recognize Somaliland was a missed opportunity. Somaliland has functioned separately from Mogadishu for decades; Indian recognition would be consistent with past precedents and signal a willingness to protect national interests across the Indian Ocean basin. Coordinated US‑India engagement with Somaliland could enable complementary security arrangements—India hosting a naval facility while the US maintains nearby aerial logistics or surveillance capacity—deepening interoperability and long‑term ties.
Mozambique likewise offers a concrete chance to build influence. With the insurgency in Cabo Delgado receding and the country’s gas fields and Pemba’s deepwater port proving strategically valuable, India could partner with Mozambique on development, infrastructure, and security cooperation—supporting regional stability while strengthening Indian influence in the western Indian Ocean.
Words in strategy documents are useful, but not enough. If Washington truly intends to check Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean, it must repair and deepen ties with New Delhi and convert rhetorical alignment into a practical division of responsibilities: which partners will lead engagement with specific littoral states, who will cultivate interior African relationships, what facilities are required, and how to fold African governments into a durable security and development framework.
Security in the Indian Ocean cannot be limited to challenges emerging from the South China Sea or the Bay of Bengal. With Chinese logistics and influence entrenched in Djibouti and spreading westward, US and Indian strategy must deliberately expand west to include Africa’s maritime coast—through coordinated diplomacy, investment, and calibrated military presence—to preserve freedom of navigation and an enduring balance of power in the region.
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
