Germany has announced a massive rearmament plan that includes developing new offensive weaponry and increasing military manpower to levels not seen in Western Europe since the Cold War.
The plan pursues two goals: countering perceived threats from an expansionist Russia and an assertive China, and replacing Europe’s defense dependency on an increasingly unpredictable and sometimes hostile United States. Germany is prepared to shoulder the task of freeing Europe from big-power intimidation.
“We are transforming the Bundeswehr into Europe’s strongest conventional army,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said as he outlined the future “strategic orientation” of the armed forces. “In the short term, we are enhancing our defensive capabilities. In the medium term, we aim for a significant buildup of capacity. In the long term, we will ensure technological superiority.”
Pistorius presented these plans after statements by Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who argues for a robust European defense. Merz cites Russia’s war on Ukraine and former US President Donald Trump’s hostility toward NATO as reasons for European self-reliance, and on occasion includes China among the threats.
At the Munich Security Conference in February, Merz warned of dangers facing an under-defended Europe. “First and foremost,” he said, “there is Russia’s violent revisionism, a brutal war against Ukraine, against our political order, with the most severe war crimes being committed on a daily basis.” He added that the post–Cold War unipolar moment is gone and the US claim to leadership is being challenged. He also warned that China “has the ambition to shape global affairs” and could, in the foreseeable future, match the US in military might and “reinterpret the international order on its own terms.”
A Defense Ministry document issued by Pistorius outlines roughly $1 trillion in new defense projects to be completed by 2035. Key priorities include:
• Developing air defense, long-range missile-strike capabilities, and data-driven warfare tools, with artificial intelligence playing a growing role.
• Creating “deep strike” rockets, cruise missiles, and armed drones to hit targets beyond front-line positions, including command centers, supply routes, and infrastructure used to mount attacks.
• Increasing combat manpower from about 200,000 to 460,000 by combining active troops and reservists, and forming non-combat reserve units to support Germany’s likely role as Europe’s main logistical hub.
• Cutting bureaucratic delays through digital processing and AI to speed decision-making.
“These strategies are living documents,” Pistorius cautioned, saying they will be updated periodically. Some innovations will not be publicized: “Otherwise,” he quipped, “we might as well add Vladimir Putin to our email distribution list.”
Other NATO members have announced capability upgrades, though not as expansive as Germany’s. France plans to enhance its nuclear deterrent. Britain says it has modern technical defenses but aging hardware. Italy is developing projects with partners.
Merz’s stance on the Russian threat contrasts sharply with those of two previous chancellors, Gerhard Schroeder and Angela Merkel, both of whom downplayed military buildup.
Schroeder, chancellor from 1998 to 2005, pursued close ties with Vladimir Putin, prioritized Russian gas supplies, and sought distance from Washington. His sponsorship of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline symbolized that approach; after leaving office he worked as a paid lobbyist for Gazprom. When Putin first invaded Ukraine in 2014, Schroeder blamed NATO rather than Moscow, framing Russian actions as driven by fears of encirclement. During his tenure, defense spending fell to a post–Cold War low of about 1.3% of GDP.
Merkel was more guarded toward Putin but still believed dialogue and economic ties could domesticate Moscow. She opposed strong sanctions after the 2014 invasion and insisted on completing Nord Stream 2—a project later sabotaged by an explosion in September 2022. Though once seen as Europe’s leading figure, Merkel’s policy of engagement with Russia drew criticism in parts of Europe as overly optimistic. After leaving office, she defended her record, saying she had understood Putin’s tendencies yet saw value in maintaining trade ties: “I don’t see that I should now have to say that was wrong,” she said, adding she would not apologize.
Merz’s approach is different: to offer a European alternative in world affairs, independent yet muscular—a Germany willing to lead a stronger, self-reliant Europe.
