Naval mines bobbing in the Persian Gulf, Iranian speedboats raking ships with machine-gun fire in the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States in the middle of the fight—this recalls the 1980s “Tanker War” more than today’s paused conflict. Then, Iran targeted shipping during its war with Iraq and U.S. warships escorted Kuwaiti tankers to keep crude flowing to world markets. Could Washington do the same now?
The U.S. could choose to more aggressively protect vessels transiting the strait, which carries roughly 20% of global traded oil and natural gas in peacetime. The Navy has previously provided limited escorts—for example in the Red Sea against Houthi attacks—and President Donald Trump recently said he ordered U.S. forces to “shoot and kill” small Iranian boats. But repeating the Tanker War model would be difficult: military technology, tactics and political goals have changed.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) long uses small, fast boats—often civilian platforms armed with heavy machine guns and rockets—to shadow and harass larger warships. This week, the Guard seized two cargo ships in a display that, beyond propaganda, showed how limited forces can disrupt the strait and threaten the global economy even amid a U.S.-Israeli blockade of Iran’s coasts.
The original Tanker War grew out of the Iraq–Iran conflict. Iraq attacked Iranian oil targets and tankers; Iran retaliated against ships in the Gulf and laid mines. Iraq attacked more vessels overall, but Iran’s mining caused major disruption. The U.S., which had supported Saddam Hussein with intelligence and materiel, launched Operation Earnest Will, reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti tankers under U.S. protection.
That mission carried real danger: the reflagged Kuwaiti supertanker Bridgeton struck a mine while under U.S. escort; an Iraqi missile strike on USS Stark killed 37 sailors; an Iranian mine wounded 10 on USS Samuel B. Roberts; and the U.S. mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing all 290 aboard. Still, the Navy successfully escorted about 70 convoys through the region.
Replicating that effort today faces several hurdles. To reassure global shipping, the U.S. would have to establish a cordon Iran could not pierce—hard when a single missile, drone or boat-borne strike could reignite fears. “Just in terms of the way military technology has evolved, especially on that asymmetrical side, it’s much more difficult to secure a waterway now than it was then,” said Torbjorn Soltvedt of Verisk Maplecroft. Unless Iran’s ability to deploy fast boats, drones and short-range missiles is significantly curtailed or there is an agreement, the threat persists—partly why European states have refused to join escort missions until the war ends.
Policy aims also differ. The Reagan-era mission had a narrow, clear goal—keep the strait open. Today, U.S. objectives appear broader and less defined. Former diplomat and naval officer Tom Duffy notes contemporary goals range from regime change to maximalist aims, and recent White House comments suggesting a ceasefire remains intact because U.S. and Israeli ships aren’t being attacked indicate a departure from long-standing U.S. practice emphasizing freedom of the seas.
In the Red Sea, the Navy limited escorts to U.S.-flagged vessels or those carrying U.S. government cargo, and ships there encountered the most intense maritime combat since World War II. A decision to use force to make the Strait of Hormuz safe could prompt similarly severe clashes. Whether the current U.S. administration seeks such a fight—or can impose the kind of security seen in the 1980s—remains uncertain.
