Trump warned in a Financial Times interview that “If there’s no response or if it’s a negative response (to his proposed Hormuz naval coalition), I think it will be very bad for the future of Nato…We have a thing called Nato. We’ve been very sweet. We didn’t have to help them with Ukraine. Ukraine is thousands of miles away from us…But we helped them. Now we’ll see if they help us. Because I’ve long said that we’ll be there for them but they won’t be there for us. And I’m not sure that they’d be there.”
The implicit threat is that Trump could reduce US support for Ukraine — for example by restricting arms transfers — if NATO members refuse to join a US-led naval coalition to secure the Strait of Hormuz and “knock out some bad actors that are along the [Iranian] shore.”
That places NATO in a bind. Its strategy has been to sustain Ukraine’s fight until a US administration hostile to Russia returns, yet it is reluctant to risk direct military losses in a conflict with Iran. If the US withholds support, the war in Ukraine would be harder to sustain; conversely, if NATO helps reopen the strait, allied forces could face casualties that would provoke domestic backlash and imperil political careers.
There is a further economic dimension. Refusing to aid US efforts could keep oil prices higher for longer, hurting voters, but might also make it likelier the US extends a temporary waiver on sanctions for Russian oil — something the EU opposes. Thus NATO must weigh military and political costs of intervening against economic and reputational costs of not doing so, including a greater chance of a Russian victory in Ukraine.
Objectively, the US is not expected to fully withdraw its forces from Europe if NATO declines to join the Hormuz coalition, so some military costs of non-participation are limited. Economic costs could be mitigated if Europe reverses anti-Russian energy policy by buying more Russian oil or reopening pipelines — though that would carry its own political consequences. The most significant risk remains a weakening of support for Ukraine and a possible Russian victory.
That outcome might seem contrary to Trump’s interests in legacy terms, but he could be willing to tolerate or even facilitate a softer stance toward Russia if Moscow helps him achieve objectives in Iran or if he seeks to punish NATO for non-cooperation. Putin could also sweeten a post-conflict US-Russia rapprochement with resource-centric partnerships, making such a deal plausible.
NATO should therefore prepare for both contingencies: either joining a risky Iran confrontation and diverting resources from Ukraine, or refusing and facing economic pain, strained US ties, and an increased chance of Russian gains. In either case, Russia could exploit a Western redirection of arms to pressure Ukraine more effectively and extract greater concessions from Kyiv.
This article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with edits for clarity and updates on Trump’s response on Friday.
