Hong Kong, March 18 (ANI): Conspiracy theories have emerged since President Donald Trump’s attack on Iran — some suggest he acted to punish China by disrupting its oil supplies. Such theories, however, overestimate Trump’s strategic intent. More plausibly, American overconfidence and poor planning by senior US leaders have created a wider crisis.
Trump’s strikes on Iran, alongside Israeli action, appear to lack a clear strategic endgame. Iran has responded asymmetrically, threatening the Strait of Hormuz and constricting global oil and gas flows. That Iran’s move surprised Washington and that the US was unprepared highlights significant planning failures. Weeks after launching the campaign, the US only recently redeployed the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit from Japan to the Gulf. Until then, US operations relied largely on air and naval strikes without pre-positioned ground forces.
Capabilities gaps are evident elsewhere too: two of three US mine-hunting vessels in the Middle East are reportedly in Malaysia, far from where they are needed. Washington has been pressing other states to send warships to clear mines and escort tankers, an embarrassing reversal given that the US initiated the conflict.
China is watching closely. While US strikes that degrade Iranian defenses demonstrate American firepower, the campaign has exposed weaknesses in planning and risks depleting weapons stocks. As Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, put it: “The Iran war is a learning laboratory for the PLA. Make no mistake, this is a valuable opportunity for China to gain more insight into the American way of war.”
Trump’s actions also contradict the National Security Strategy issued in November 2025, which had signaled a move away from the Middle East. The document emphasized that the region would recede as a central focus of US policy, becoming more a source of partnership and investment rather than constant crisis. The president’s decision to attack Iran upended that posture.
White House explanations for the strikes have been thin. Trump said he acted because he “had a good feeling that the Iranian regime was going to strike” US assets, a claim framed by press secretary Karoline Leavitt as “a feeling based on facts.” Critics note that much of the administration’s counsel reportedly came from close aides and political allies rather than career national security professionals.
Davis warned the conflict could last weeks to months, pulling US forces from other theaters and depleting missiles and long-range strike weapons. If ground forces are committed, demands on the US military would spike, potentially eroding readiness in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
On March 15, Trump urged countries including China, France, Japan, South Korea and the UK to send warships to the Strait of Hormuz, arguing they have a shared interest in keeping the waterway open. The appeal underscored a strategic paradox: the US started the war but now seeks others — even rivals — to help manage its consequences. Australia declined to send ships; Davis applauded that decision, noting Beijing will be watching and weighing any opportunity to press its own interests, including regarding Taiwan.
China’s foreign minister Wang Yi criticized the attack in calls with counterparts from Bahrain, Kuwait, Pakistan and Qatar, calling the conflict unnecessary and counterproductive and urging a return to negotiations, dialogue and common security. Beijing has framed its response around diplomacy and stability rather than military involvement.
Trump’s reliance on force appears to have eroded allied trust. A Politico poll of Canada, Germany, France and the UK found growing public disenchantment with US foreign policy and an increased view of China as a more dependable partner — not necessarily because China is seen as benign, but because US unpredictability has unsettled partners. Former US officials argue that Washington’s behavior has aided a Chinese narrative portraying the US as selfish and domineering.
European and other leaders have pursued closer ties with Beijing amid the turbulence: Canada, the UK, France and Germany have all deepened economic engagements with China in recent months. At the same time, social media trends among younger Western audiences — amplified by pro-China messaging — have softened perceptions of China’s authoritarianism.
Think tanks map a complex future for US-China relations. A Brookings report suggests that rather than a grand bargain, rivalry and managed cooperation will persist, with transactional leader-level engagements alongside technological, economic and security competition. For Indo-Pacific states, a tacit G2 could bring both reduced near-term risk and longer-term marginalization as great-power dynamics dominate.
Trump’s framing of US-China relations as a possible “G2” and his planned summit with Xi Jinping have raised concern in places like Taiwan. Observers warn accommodation could leave Taiwan vulnerable as a bargaining chip. Taiwan officials and analysts view any potential shift toward accommodation with alarm, given the existential stakes.
For its part, Beijing appears to seek stabilization and space to fortify its strategic priorities. Ryan Hass of Brookings argued that delaying or threatening the summit is unlikely to coerce Beijing; instead, China sees the meeting as a chance to shore up ties and advance its own resilience against US pressure.
The current crisis illustrates that military action can win battles without producing trust or stability, particularly in the Middle East. Trump’s gamble — initiated with vague objectives and little planning apparent to partners — has strained alliances and offered China diplomatic openings. Beijing’s cautious diplomacy and calls for negotiation stand in contrast to Washington’s military-first approach, and allies are hedging, diversifying ties, and strengthening their own defenses as uncertainty over US leadership endures.
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