The VLCC Skipper was seized by the U.S. Coast Guard under a court warrant, with assistance from two helicopters from the USS Gerald R. Ford and U.S. Marines executing the takeover. The operation was lawful under U.S. and international law despite protests from some U.S. lawmakers and foreign officials.

The tanker was loaded with sanctioned oil and is bound for Galveston, Texas, where the vessel and its cargo will face U.S. forfeiture proceedings. The ship, formerly named Adisa, has been on the U.S. sanctions list since 2022 for participation in an illicit oil-smuggling network tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah.

Officially registered to Triton Navigation Corp., based in the Marshall Islands, Skipper is managed by Nigeria’s Thomarose Global Ventures Ltd. Its ownership operates through a complex structure linked to shadow fleets known for Iran-related oil smuggling and sanctions evasion.

Despite U.S. Treasury sanctions, the Skipper reportedly operated for three years, smuggling Venezuelan and Iranian oil. While flying a Guyanese flag, it was not properly registered there. Following the seizure, the U.S. added sanctions on six more VLCCs tied to three nephews of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s wife, Cilia Flores; two of these nephews had previously been convicted in the U.S. on drug charges before being released in a prisoner exchange. The newly sanctioned tankers include the White Crane, Kiara M., H. Constance, Lattafa, Monique and Tamia.

The Skipper’s cargo is estimated around $100 million. Market valuations for a 20-year-old VLCC vary—commonly $80–$90 million, though at least one expert suggested a much lower figure. The ship ran oil to Cuba, where Asian middlemen allegedly “laundered” the cargo. The vessel and cargo were uninsured. Under UNCLOS, a vessel without valid nationality is considered stateless.

Skipper is a roughly 333-meter very large crude carrier (displacing over 300,000 tons deadweight) and is required to use an Automatic Identification System (AIS). AIS broadcasts a ship’s identity, position, speed and heading via VHF radio and is also collected by low-earth-orbit satellites. AIS is essential for maritime safety and tracking but can be spoofed or turned off. Skipper is known to have reported false AIS positions—sometimes thousands of miles from its real location—and to have shut down its transponder to conceal ports of call or to conduct ship-to-ship transfers.

Spoofing is uncovered by matching satellite detections with vessel reports; commercial tracking firms use algorithms to detect spoofing and ship behavior indicative of sanctions evasion. The U.S. government buys such reports and uses them in enforcement. That tracking likely contributed to Skipper’s placement on the sanctions list years ago.

The U.S. has prior precedents: in 2020 it seized about 1.1 million barrels of Iranian fuel from four vessels bound for Venezuela; in 2014 it seized the MV Morning Glory, allegedly after theft. Data intelligence firm Kpler reports that from January 2024 to July 2025 it identified 261 vessels that spoofed AIS before being sanctioned. Of those, 61 were sanctioned within three to six months and 59 within six to nine months; many others were not sanctioned.

If only the most blatant offenders—often those tied to terrorism—make it onto sanction lists, and only a couple of oil tankers have been seized, much of the so-called ghost fleet has operated with limited practical threat to its activities. That allowance helps rogue regimes such as Venezuela and Iran, and enablers like Cuba, continue funding criminal networks, terrorist proxies and powerful insiders.

The seizure of the Skipper is likely only the tip of a much larger clandestine oil-smuggling iceberg.

Stephen Bryen, senior Asia Times correspondent and former U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense. First published in the newsletter Weapons and Strategy; republished with permission.

The VLCC Skipper was seized by the U.S. Coast Guard under a court warrant, with helicopters from the USS Gerald R. Ford and U.S. Marines assisting in the takeover. The seizure was legal under U.S. and international law, despite criticisms from some U.S. lawmakers and foreign officials.

The tanker was carrying about 2 million tons of sanctioned oil and is en route to Galveston, Texas. Both the vessel and its cargo will face U.S. forfeiture proceedings. Formerly named Adisa, the Skipper has been on the U.S. sanctions list since 2022 for involvement in an illicit oil-smuggling network tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah.

Officially registered to Triton Navigation Corp. in the Marshall Islands, the ship is managed by Nigeria’s Thomarose Global Ventures Ltd., and operates under complex ownership structures associated with shadow fleets used for Iranian oil smuggling and sanctions evasion.

Despite U.S. Treasury Department sanctions, the Skipper operated openly for three years, transporting Venezuelan and Iranian oil. The 333-meter VLCC flew a Guyanese flag but was not actually registered in Guyana. After the seizure, the U.S. imposed new sanctions on six additional VLCCs linked to three nephews of Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores; two of those nephews had earlier been convicted in the United States on drug-trafficking charges and later released in a prisoner exchange. The six newly sanctioned tankers are White Crane, Kiara M., H. Constance, Lattafa, Monique and Tamia.

The Skipper’s cargo is worth roughly $100 million. A typical fair market price for a 20-year-old VLCC is about $80–$90 million, though at least one expert values this ship as low as $25 million. The vessel engaged in transfers to Cuba where cargo was reportedly “laundered” by Asian middlemen. The ship and its cargo were uninsured. Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a vessel without valid nationality is considered “stateless.”

All ships over 300 tons are required to use an Automatic Identification System (AIS). AIS broadcasts a vessel’s identity, speed, heading and GPS position via VHF radio, with a line-of-sight range of roughly 45 miles; those signals are also picked up by low-Earth-orbit satellites. AIS is essential for maritime safety and tracking, but it can be easily spoofed. Operators can manually feed false data into a transponder or use deception software to make a ship appear elsewhere. The Skipper repeatedly reported false AIS positions—sometimes thousands of miles from its actual location—and at times shut off its transponder to conceal ports of call or to facilitate clandestine ship-to-ship oil transfers.

Spoofing is often uncovered when commercial and government trackers correlate satellite observations with AIS reports; that kind of analysis likely contributed to the Skipper’s placement on the U.S. sanctions list three years ago. Commercial intelligence firms that monitor shipping, including providers of high-value cargo tracking, sell reports to governments; the U.S. purchases such data and uses sophisticated algorithms to detect spoofing and unauthorized AIS shutdowns.

This is not the first seizure of tankers by the United States. In 2020 the U.S. seized 1.1 million barrels of Iranian fuel from four vessels bound for Venezuela. In 2014 the MV Morning Glory was seized after allegations it was carrying stolen oil.

Data intelligence firm Kpler reported that from January 2024 to July 2025 it identified 261 vessels that spoofed their AIS prior to being sanctioned. Kpler called spoofing a “fast track to sanctions,” noting that 61 of those vessels were sanctioned within three to six months and 59 within six to nine months; others remain unsanctioned.

Assuming only the worst offenders make sanction lists—and only two tankers have been seized—the bulk of the ghost fleets have been allowed to operate with little effective interdiction. That dynamic lets rogue regimes and their partners—Venezuela, Iran and intermediaries like Cuba—continue funneling revenue into illicit networks, funding cartels, terrorist activities and enriching key figures such as members of the Maduro circle, IRGC leaders and Hezbollah.

The seizure of the Skipper is only the tip of the iceberg.

Stephen Bryen, a senior Asia Times correspondent and former U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense, first published this article in his newsletter Weapons and Strategy. It is republished with permission.