NASA is preparing to launch Artemis II, a manned lunar flyby and the first mission to carry astronauts to lunar distance in 50 years. The flight is planned for April, and on March 12 NASA announced the launch would proceed. Nevertheless, serious spacecraft problems remain. NASA believes the issues are resolved or mitigated; outside experts say the risks may still be too high for a crewed flight.
Artemis began in 2017 as a follow-on to Apollo, and by the end of 2025 the U.S. had spent about $93 billion on the program. Each Artemis launch costs roughly $4.2 billion. Artemis aims to enable longer stays on the Moon and help prepare for future crewed missions to Mars.
Apollo had notable successes and serious failures: a 1967 prelaunch fire on Apollo 1 killed three astronauts and forced a complete command-module redesign, and Apollo 13 suffered an oxygen-tank explosion in 1970 that aborted its lunar landing but ended with a safe return.
The central safety question for Artemis II is whether the Orion crew module and its systems are ready to protect astronauts during reentry and landing. Much of the concern focuses on Orion’s heat shield and its AVCOAT thermal protection tiles.
Artemis I, an unmanned test flight launched November 16, 2022, returned December 11, 2022. NASA called the mission a success, but a 2024 NASA Inspector General (IG) report documented serious problems. The IG identified the heat shield as the highest risk: Orion reenters at very high speed, producing extreme heating—reported near 5,000°F for Artemis I. In contrast, SpaceX’s Crew Dragon experiences lower reentry temperatures because it returns at roughly 40% slower speed.
Postflight inspections of Artemis I found significant damage: more than half of the AVCOAT tiles were cracked or broken, and portions of the char layer wore away differently than predicted. Rather than melting cleanly, the material fractured and produced debris that trailed the capsule, threatening the parachutes needed for splashdown. The IG warned that unexpected AVCOAT behavior could mean the heat shield might not sufficiently protect systems and crew on future missions.
Separately, the four CM/SM separation bolts that hold Orion to its service module showed unexpected melting and erosion on three bolts. These bolts are severed by pyrotechnics before reentry to jettison the service module. The IG cautioned that severe erosion could exceed structural limits and, in a worst case, lead to vehicle breakup during reentry. NASA plans to add thermal protective material to the bolts, but those changes have not yet been fully tested.
NASA’s planned mitigation centers on changing Orion’s reentry trajectory—adjusting the skip behavior and entry angle so trapped gases in the heat-shield char layer can vent differently. NASA scientists hypothesize that gas trapped in AVCOAT during reentry, rather than escaping through the material, caused the atypical char behavior. Ground “arc tests” were run at higher temperatures to produce a permeable char layer that allowed gases to escape; however, those tests’ relevance to actual reentry conditions has been questioned.
Other concerns include launch-induced vibration effects. The IG reported substantial damage to Mobile Launcher-1 and ground infrastructure during the Artemis I launch, including blast and debris impacts to the launcher elevator system. Strong vibrations during launch could potentially weaken or compromise the heat shield before reentry. One straightforward simulation—mounting an Orion heat shield on a shaker table to test vibration effects—has no reported results.
Manufacturing and quality-control questions also persist. NASA states that for Artemis III and later flights it will implement heat-shield modifications: better uniformity, controlled permeability, and changes to AVCOAT manufacturing methods to reduce weak spots. Critics ask why Artemis II is proceeding without those manufacturing improvements already in place.
NASA believes the risks can be managed with trajectory changes, bolt protection, and other mitigations. The IG warns that altering reentry profiles could introduce new stresses or unknown failure modes if the residual effects of design and operational changes are not fully understood. Given the heat-shield damage seen on Artemis I and unresolved manufacturing and testing questions, some experts argue the risk to astronaut safety is too high and that NASA should reconsider launching Artemis II before validated hardware and processes are in place.
Senior Asia Times correspondent Stephen Bryen is a former U.S. deputy under secretary of defense. Gregory De Santis, PhD, holds degrees in mathematics and aeronautical and mechanical engineering. As a NASA research engineer he worked on life support and reentry projects for Gemini, Apollo and Skylab and served as U.S. Army program manager for life support and protective systems.
This article was originally published on Stephen Bryen’s Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy.
