Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission.
In the early 1990s President Lech Wałęsa envisioned Poland becoming a “second Japan.” Today Poland has instead emerged as NATO’s primary logistics hub supporting Ukraine, a transformation that suggests Japan might play an analogous role for Taiwan. That prospect raises fundamental questions about alliance strategy, burden-sharing and the realities of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Poland’s hub evolved rapidly from modest deliveries into comprehensive support—weapons, humanitarian aid, refugee assistance, maintenance, medical care and training. The shift required major infrastructure investment to address vulnerabilities exposed by war: rail-gauge incompatibility, border-crossing bottlenecks and capacity constraints across the logistics chain. With US, NATO and EU backing, Warsaw expanded rail capacity, streamlined customs and developed transport infrastructure. Poland’s political economy was favorable: broad public consensus viewing Russia as an existential threat and local participation in defense spending.
Japan faces a different set of constraints. Taiwan is an island separated by over 100 kilometers of water; any logistics operation for Taiwan would depend entirely on maritime and air transport, both vulnerable to interdiction. Japanese recognition of these stakes is growing: political leaders have characterized a Taiwan contingency as an “existential crisis” for Japan, and Beijing’s retaliatory measures demonstrate how declaratory debate can provoke Chinese countermeasures and diplomatic pressure.
To function as an effective logistics hub, Japan would need large-scale expansion of ports, airports and storage not just on the Nansei Islands nearest Taiwan but across the country. Japan must receive and store deliveries from Australia, Europe and the United States before distributing them to Taiwan—requiring massive investment in an already congested system. Unlike Poland, which benefits from NATO’s Article 5 deterrent against attacks on its territory, Japan faces the prospect of strikes across the Western Pacific in a Taiwan invasion scenario, potentially including US bases on Japanese soil. Even short of full invasion, China’s “gray zone” capabilities could severely disrupt maritime and air routes without triggering automatic alliance responses.
Deterrence entails a paradox: insufficient preparation invites a gamble that Taiwan can be seized before allies respond, while too-visible preparations may prompt China to act sooner. Some analysts argue military upgrades should be concealed until fielded; that approach clashes with democratic transparency and the need to visibly reassure Taiwan. Japan must balance these tensions.
Taiwan’s own vulnerabilities compound the problem. It is highly dependent on imports—food self-sufficiency is limited, energy imports exceed 90%, and stockpiles for critical materials are inadequate. The merchant fleet has shrunk and most vessels sail under flags of convenience, potentially unavailable in crisis. Taiwan’s policies for securing energy, resources and food are not designed for the worst-case scenario of a complete blockade.
Domestic politics in Japan also complicate logistics hub ambitions. Customs infrastructure would be strained by surges in military cargo; local governments and communities with pacifist traditions could resist expanded basing and storage. Public opinion toward China is ambivalent: China is simultaneously Japan’s second-largest trading partner and its principal security concern—unlike Poland, where anti-Russian sentiment created consensus for support to Ukraine.
US strategic planning adds another layer. Recent US documents emphasize burden-sharing and identify a future in which Washington relies more heavily on a subset of capable, trusted partners for regional security. If the United States prepares for great-power conflict fought with select partners rather than broad coalitions, allies like Poland and Japan could be pressed to function less as mere logistics hubs and more as forward partners managing substantial regional threats. For Japan, that would require defense spending and capabilities beyond current increases: integrated command-and-control, advanced ISR, and political willingness to host forward-deployed US systems.
Given the risks of provocation and domestic backlash, Washington should avoid expecting Japan to become a straight European analogue. A pragmatic path emphasizes incremental, sustainable capacity-building: gradual infrastructure investments, dispersed logistics responsibilities shared minilaterally with Australia, South Korea and the Philippines, and measures that reduce political exposure for any single country. Prioritizing deterrence by denial—making an invasion of Taiwan difficult and costly—addresses the immediate invasion threat more effectively than relying primarily on sustainment logistics.
Addressing Taiwan’s own fragilities must precede or at least accompany any large-scale Japanese logistics build-up. Strengthening Taiwan’s food security, energy resilience and stockpiles of critical minerals will determine whether external logistics support can meaningfully sustain society under pressure. Absent improvements in Taiwan’s resilience, an elaborate Japanese hub has limited strategic value.
Selective economic interdependence with China should be preserved as a source of deterrent leverage. Completely decoupling would forfeit asymmetric economic levers that could be used to threaten heavy sanctions in wartime, and might accelerate Chinese incentives to resolve Taiwan by force. Maintaining calibrated economic ties gives the United States and allies leverage while keeping open political and economic channels.
Decisions made now about alliance roles, burden-sharing and deterrence strategy will shape options for future generations. Simple analogies to Europe obscure the Indo-Pacific’s distinct geography, politics and power dynamics. The central question is not whether Japan can become a “second Poland,” but whether the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners can craft a tailored framework for Taiwan’s security—one that balances military preparation with diplomatic restraint, capability development with sensitivity to Chinese redlines, and burden-sharing with recognition that burdens cannot and should not be shared equally.
Stephen R. Nagy PhD ([email protected]) is a professor of politics and international studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo, senior fellow and China Project lead at the Macdonald Laurier Institute and Director of Policy Studies at Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies.
Paweł Behrendt PhD ([email protected]) is a University of Vienna alumnus whose interests include Japan and China’s foreign and defense policies, international relations and security in East Asia. He is the author of Chińczycy grają w go (The Chinese Play Go) and Korzenie niemieckich sukcesów w Azji (The roots of German success in Asia).
