“Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.”
Napoleon Bonaparte’s maxim may well have been in the minds of policymakers in Moscow and Beijing as the US war in Iran dragged on. Now that a 14-day ceasefire between Tehran and Washington is in effect — with both sides claiming victory — Russian and Chinese leaders still have an opportunity to profit from what many see as America’s latest folly in the Middle East.
Throughout the weeks-long conflict, China and Russia struck a delicate balance. Both declined to give Iran their full-throated support or to sink major resources into the fighting. Instead they offered limited assistance: small-scale intelligence and diplomatic backing. Beijing and Moscow recognized that Iran could not “win” against the combined military power of the US and Israel; it only needed to survive to serve the strategic interests of Washington’s main geopolitical rivals.
Below are four ways the war in Iran weakened US position in the 21st-century great power competition.
1. Losing the influence war in the Middle East
The US has long struggled to balance competing objectives in the Middle East. By the 2020s Washington prioritized limiting the influence of great-power rivals, especially China and, to a lesser degree, Russia. Under Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, China and Russia steadily expanded their regional footprint through formal ties and informal measures.
Russia aligned more closely with Iran and intervened in Syria; China boosted its diplomatic profile, notably mediating the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement. Recent developments had been unfavorable to both: the fall of Assad in 2024 removed Russia’s reliable regional ally, while Trump’s May 2025 Gulf tour had aimed to blunt China’s influence by securing deals with Gulf states.
The Iran war undercut Washington’s regional standing. With the US increasingly seen as an unreliable protector, Gulf states may seek greater security and economic cooperation elsewhere. That opens space for Beijing and Moscow to deepen ties and expand influence.
2. Diverting US attention from other strategic goals
Over two decades, Russia and China exploited Washington’s desire to pivot away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific. The Trump administration’s 2025 national security strategy announced a focus on the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific, with the Middle East’s importance supposed to recede. By co-launching a war in Tehran with Israel without consulting other allies, Trump contradicted that strategy and sidelined priorities in the Americas and Asia.
The conflict also highlighted and widened rifts between the US and allies. NATO, already strained by Trump’s prior threats and unconventional stances, showed further signs of division. China and Russia benefit from cracks between America and its partners, gaining strategic space while US attention is consumed by a new Middle East war.
3. Disproportionate economic fallout
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil passes — dealt predictable and damaging blows to US interests. Higher oil prices helped Russia’s war economy. At the same time, the US temporarily eased some sanctions on Russian oil, providing Moscow economic relief after years of pressure.
China, while harmed by an energy shock, is better prepared to weather disruption. Beijing has invested in domestic energy reserves, diversified its mix toward solar, batteries and coal, and pushed to boost domestic consumption over reliance on global trade. Those measures cushion China against global energy instability, while the US — more exposed to disruptions in the strait and to higher energy costs — loses leverage in the region as Iran appears to restrict access for unfriendly nations.
4. Loss of global leadership
Trump’s willingness to abandon diplomacy for war, and his shifting rhetoric throughout the conflict, weakened US credibility as an honest broker. That erosion of soft power gave a boost to Beijing. China pressed Iran to accept the 14-day ceasefire proposal brokered by Pakistan and has been steadily chipping away at America’s role as mediator of first resort.
Beijing has successfully mediated regional disputes before and has attempted broader peacemaking efforts elsewhere. The Iran war reinforces a Chinese narrative that the US-led liberal international order is waning and shows China stepping into leadership roles Washington once filled. For Russia, the conflict — and the rupture between Trump and NATO over support — eases pressure on Moscow by diverting global attention and US resources away from the war in Ukraine.
Jeffrey Taliaferro is professor of political science, Tufts University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.
