Silicon Valley futurist Roy Amara observed that we “tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run.” Amara’s Law helps make sense of disruption beyond tech — including energy shocks.

An American strike on Iran produces immediate, visible harms: disrupted oil, petrochemical and fertilizer supply chains, rising prices, and tragic loss of life. Longer-term consequences are harder to measure. The Iranian regime may survive; regional relationships could be strained for generations. Tehran might emerge more confident, and a new cohort of Iranians could carry durable anti‑Western sentiment. Like the first atomic blast, strategic lessons learned about using chokepoints as political weapons cannot be unlearned.

Those dynamics matter far beyond the region. Energy‑hungry, resource‑poor Asian economies face the prospect that a vital artery such as the Strait of Hormuz can be constricted suddenly. Most Asian states neither want to be drawn into military efforts to secure supply nor rely on costly strategic stockpiles intended mainly to support military readiness. They need practical, market‑based alternatives.

Canada offers one. Alberta holds the world’s third‑largest proven oil reserves, after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Current Alberta oil production is roughly four million barrels per day — in principle enough to meet a country like Japan’s oil demand. The province is also a major natural gas producer and has abundant, low‑cost electricity useful for liquefaction and export infrastructure. But production is constrained by a lack of market access.

Nearly 90% of Alberta’s oil exports flow to the United States, primarily to Midwest refineries. With few alternatives, Canada effectively sells into a monopsony and accepts a persistent price discount — commonly ranging from about 17% to 37%. Two factors have reinforced this status quo: successive federal policies that have limited resource development in the name of climate goals, and the long belief in a stable, mutually beneficial US‑Canada energy relationship.

That picture is shifting. The election of Mark Carney to a senior economic role signaled a more pragmatic approach. Economic and political pressures, along with a desire to diversify trade away from an increasingly unilateral and sometimes predatory U.S. partner, have given new urgency to westward market access. Public finances and growth prospects also make expanded energy development attractive to Canada.

The key constraint is tidewater access. Canada has one major pipeline to the Pacific — the Trans Mountain Pipeline. After its 2024 expansion it can carry just under one million barrels per day, up from roughly 350,000. The project cost about US$30 billion and required federal acquisition to proceed. Plans to add another roughly 200,000 barrels per day are under consideration, but more capacity will be needed to make a sustained impact.

A meaningful expansion of export capacity on the West Coast, supported by foreign investment in pipelines and upstream development, could offer Asia a stable, politically predictable energy source insulated from Middle Eastern instability. For Canada, greater access to Pacific markets would support higher production, increased royalties and a narrowing of the price discount on southbound exports. Most oil would still flow to the U.S., but overall benefits would be significant.

The rockets over the Persian Gulf will eventually stop; tankers will return to the Strait. Yet Amara’s insight warns that the deeper, long‑term effects of this moment will unfold slowly. What is clearer now is that conditions for a strategic shift in energy supply chains — toward Canada’s Pacific gateways — have perhaps never been more favorable.

Charlie Grahn is a supply chain veteran and business instructor at Langara College in Vancouver, Canada.

Silicon Valley futurist Roy Amara famously observed in the 1970s that we “tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run.”

That insight—later dubbed “Amara’s Law”—has since traveled far beyond the realm of technology, offering a useful paradigm through which to understand disruption in all its forms.

Consider America’s attack on Iran. Its immediate costs are readily measurable: disruptions to oil, petrochemical, and fertilizer supply chains; rising global prices; and, most starkly, the loss of human life. These are the visible, short-term consequences.

The longer-term effects are far less quantifiable and certain. One conclusion appears difficult to avoid: the Iranian regime will endure. In the process, however, its relationships with Arab neighbors may be strained for generations.

Also, rather than weakened, Tehran may emerge more self-assured; its sense of strategic confidence reinforced. A new generation of young Iranians, meanwhile, may emerge with a durable anti-Western sentiment.

Yes, the oil will flow again. Markets will stabilize; supply chains will adapt. But, as with the world’s first atomic detonation, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz reveals two enduring truths.

First, it demonstrates that such disruption is an effective political weapon. Second, like the splitting of the atom, that knowledge cannot be unlearned.

The result is a region at risk of settling into a prolonged and uncertain stasis—defined by unresolved tensions, strategic mistrust, and latent instability. The Strait itself endures, indifferent and unmoved, governed not by politics but by far older geotechnical forces.

That is a problem for the parties to the conflict. But what of others? The energy-hungry yet resource-constrained economies of Asia, for example. Are they prepared for a future in which this vital artery can be constricted so abruptly?

Hardly. Do they wish to be drawn into future conflicts to secure supply? Some may, but most regard such mercantilism as a relic of another era—prohibitively expensive, strategically fraught and morally questionable.

So-called strategic oil reserves, such as those maintained by the United States, are costly to sustain. At best, they can steady markets briefly, buying time for a supply response. Their primary purpose, however, is to support military readiness, not to underwrite long-term security.

There is, fortunately, another option for energy-hungry Asia markets. The inland Canadian province of Alberta holds the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves, after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Current production is roughly four million barrels per day—enough, in principle, to meet all of Japan’s oil demand for example.

The province is also a major natural gas producer. Equally important, it has a robust supply of inexpensive electricity needed to power the condensers required for liquefaction and shipping. Yet this is only part of the story.

Alberta’s output remains constrained by a chronic lack of infrastructure investment. Production could be significantly higher. The core challenge is market access: nearly 90% of Alberta’s oil exports flow to the United States—primarily to Midwest refineries in Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin.

With few alternative outlets, Canada effectively sells into a monopsony, thereby accepting a persistent discount to market, typically ranging from 17% to 37%.

Canadians have tolerated this arrangement for two reasons. First, successive federal governments have constrained resource development in the name of climate policy. This has been abetted by US-financed environmental groups who have smeared the industry.

Second, there has long been a belief in a stable, mutually beneficial relationship with the US. Cheap oil for goodwill in consideration of goodwill in other areas, most notably Ontario’s automotive sector, for instance.

The election of Mark Carney—former governor of both the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, plus past vice-chair of Brookfield Asset Management—has begun to shift that balance. The rhetoric remains cautious, but policy is becoming more pragmatic.

Canada’s economy, meanwhile, is under increasing pressure from a historic trading partner that is, at best, unpredictable and relentlessly self-interested. Others would claim that it’s predatory.

Many Canadians feel an absence of respect, and trade diversification has re-emerged as a serious policy objective. That ambition has been voiced for decades; this time, it carries more weight.

At the same time, public finances are tightening, and energy development offers a clear path to economic growth and fiscal stability. Alternatives are less obvious. Carney appears to understand these realities.

Western Canada presents Asia with a compelling alternative: a stable and abundant energy source, supported by well-managed ports, mature legal and financial institutions, and a predictable political environment. Crucially, it offers a direct route to Pacific markets, largely insulated from regional conflict.

The challenge remains access to tidewater. Canada has just one major pipeline to the Pacific coast: the Trans Mountain Pipeline. Following its 2024 expansion, it can carry just under one million barrels per day, up from roughly 350,000.

That project cost US$30 billion and proceeded only after the federal government stepped in to acquire it from US-based Kinder Morgan. Plans are now under consideration to add a further 200,000 barrels of capacity per day.

What both Canada and Asia need is a meaningful expansion of capacity on Canada’s West Coast. The circumstances are aligning. Direct foreign investment in pipelines and upstream development could secure a reliable energy supply for decades to come.

Just as importantly, that supply would likely remain available at a discount to global spot prices—perhaps a narrower one, but a discount nonetheless.

Most Canadian oil would still flow to the US. But Canada would benefit from higher overall production, increased royalties, and a gradual narrowing of the price discount on southbound exports.

The rockets now arcing over the Persian Gulf will, in time, fall silent. The Strait of Hormuz will once again be crowded with tankers. Yet, as Amara’s insight suggests, the deeper consequences of this moment will only become clear long after the immediate disruption has passed — and, perhaps, been forgotten.

What’s clearer is that the conditions for a dramatic energy supply chain shift have never been better.

Charlie Grahn is a supply chain veteran and business instructor at Langara College in Vancouver, Canada.

Silicon Valley futurist Roy Amara observed that we often overestimate a technology’s short-term impact and underestimate its long-term effects. That insight—Amara’s Law—helps explain how sudden disruptions reshape systems over years, not just days.

Consider a US strike on Iran. Its immediate consequences are obvious: disrupted oil, petrochemical and fertilizer supply chains, higher prices and human tragedy. The longer-term effects are harder to measure. Iran’s regime may survive and even gain strategic confidence; regional relationships could be strained for generations; and a new generation of Iranians might carry durable anti-Western sentiment. Oil shipments and markets will eventually normalize, but the knowledge that chokepoints can be weaponized won’t disappear.

That matters far beyond the Middle East. Energy-hungry Asian economies—many with limited domestic resources—face the prospect that a vital artery like the Strait of Hormuz can be abruptly constricted. Few Asian states are prepared to be dragged into repeated conflicts to secure supply. Strategic reserves can buy time but are costly and meant primarily to support military readiness, not to underwrite long-term energy security.

There is, however, an alternative. Alberta, an inland Canadian province, holds the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves, behind Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Current production runs roughly four million barrels per day—enough, in principle, to meet the oil needs of a major Asian economy. The province also produces significant natural gas and has ample, inexpensive electricity to support liquefaction and shipping infrastructure. But production is limited by insufficient market access and infrastructure investment.

Nearly 90% of Alberta’s oil exports flow to the United States, mainly to Midwest refineries. With few other outlets, Canada effectively sells into a near-monopsony and accepts a persistent price discount—often substantial—compared with global benchmarks. Two forces have helped maintain this status quo: federal policies that constrained resource development under climate considerations, and a longstanding assumption of a stable, mutually beneficial relationship with the US that made expanded Pacific access less urgent.

Those assumptions are shifting. Canada’s economic and political calculus is changing amid tightening public finances and a perception that its large neighbor can be unpredictable or self-interested. Trade diversification is back on the agenda. At the same time, pragmatic policy voices recognize that responsibly developed natural resources can drive economic growth and fiscal stability.

For Asia, western Canada offers a compelling alternative energy source: abundant hydrocarbons, reliable ports, mature legal and financial institutions, and a politically predictable supplier insulated from much of the Middle East’s volatility. The key barrier is tidewater access. Canada has only one major pipeline to the Pacific: the Trans Mountain Pipeline, whose recent expansion raised capacity to just under one million barrels per day from roughly 350,000. That project cost about US$30 billion and required federal intervention to complete. Plans exist to add further capacity, but more is needed.

A meaningful expansion of West Coast export capacity—driven by direct foreign investment in pipelines, terminals and upstream development—could secure a reliable energy supply for decades. Such supply would likely remain priced at a discount to spot markets, perhaps narrower, but still advantageous for buyers. Canada would still send most oil to the US, but higher overall production would increase royalties, reduce the southbound price discount over time, and diversify markets.

The rockets and disruptions in the Persian Gulf will eventually fade and tankers will return. Yet the deeper implications of this moment—about how chokepoints can be weaponized and how markets respond—will endure. The conditions for a significant shift in energy supply chains are unusually favorable: Canada has the resources and stability, Asia has the demand, and the geopolitical imperative to diversify sources is clear. Building the infrastructure to connect Canada’s energy wealth to Pacific markets could ease Asia’s energy anxiety while strengthening Canada’s economy.

Charlie Grahn is a supply chain veteran and business instructor at Langara College in Vancouver, Canada.