On May 30, 2018, then–Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis announced the renaming of US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command, acknowledging that strategic competition with China extends beyond the South China Sea. US defense doctrine and partnerships—most visibly the Quad and, later, AUKUS—refocused attention on the broader ocean basins. Yet these initiatives have tended to emphasize the eastern Indian Ocean, where China’s expansionism is most visible, and have not given equal weight to the western Indian Ocean and Africa’s littoral states.

China’s reach is pan-regional. Its first overseas military base in Djibouti, opened in August 2017 near the US base at Camp Lemonnier, signals ambitions beyond logistics and anti-piracy missions. From Djibouti the People’s Liberation Army Navy can operate across the western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, complementing its facilities in the eastern basin. Additional Chinese access—from Cambodia’s Ream base to deepening ties with Mauritius—further enlarges Beijing’s footprint.

Recent geopolitical moves risk accelerating this shift. The UK’s decision to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius raises strategic questions about the future of Diego Garcia, the joint US-UK military installation. If Mauritius tilts closer to China, Britain’s reversal could undermine Western presence in a vital part of the Indian Ocean.

US strategy declarations have acknowledged the Indo-Pacific’s importance but often marginalize Africa. The 2025 US National Security Strategy emphasizes keeping the Indo‑Pacific free and open, but treats Red Sea navigation largely as a Middle East issue, overlooking how African states like Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland affect maritime security. The Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy frequently references China but largely sidelines India and reduces Africa to counterterrorism concerns. This omission risks ceding influence to Beijing west of the Bay of Bengal.

America and India face a choice. New Delhi must either act proactively in the western Indian Ocean to deny China strategic space or coordinate more closely with Washington to achieve the same goal. Both should treat African littorals as integral to Indo‑Pacific strategy, not peripheral afterthoughts.

Practical steps India could take include expanding its military and diplomatic footprint beyond current positions. India’s commissioning of INS Jatayu at Minicoy is a start, but deeper engagement is needed: strengthen presence in Agalega, secure facilities in northern Madagascar, and pursue a naval base or port access in Mombasa or Zanzibar. Such moves would not merely be military; they would foster investment, commercial ties, and soft power, creating hubs for broader economic engagement in Africa.

Recognition and diplomatic posture also matter. India’s reluctance to recognize Somaliland reflects a cautious approach to sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it may be strategically limiting. Somaliland’s functional autonomy and distinct security environment present potential opportunities for partnership. Indian recognition—alone or in cooperation with the United States—could signal a willingness to protect Indian Ocean interests across the basin and increase the costs to China of further encroachment.

Resource and development diplomacy offer additional avenues for cooperation. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s vast untapped mineral wealth and Mozambique’s gas-rich, underdeveloped northern Cabo Delgado present opportunities for joint US‑India economic engagement—combining US inland influence with Indian coastal investment and development. Investment in port infrastructure and local development in places like Pemba would address root causes of instability while advancing strategic objectives.

Operational coordination between the US and India could follow a division of labor: India leads engagement with littoral and island states; the US focuses on the continental interior and broader security architectures. Jointly, they should reassess basing needs, interoperability between Indian naval presence and US air facilities, and targeted economic initiatives to offer alternatives to Chinese investment that often carries strategic strings.

Rhetoric in Washington will not suffice. To counter Beijing effectively across the Indian Ocean basin, US strategy must integrate Africa into its Indo‑Pacific calculus and rebuild cooperative ties with New Delhi. Otherwise, the balance of power in the Indian Ocean could tilt decisively toward China—above and beyond the South China Sea or the Bay of Bengal.

Michael Rubin ([email protected]) is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

This article first appeared on Pacific Forum and is republished with permission. Read the original here.

On May 30, 2018, US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis announced that, “in recognition of the increasing connectivity, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, today we rename the US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command.” His logic was solid. China’s strategic competition does not end at the Strait of Malacca, the Timor Sea or Tasmania.

US defense doctrine embraced the changes easily and continues to build upon a more holistic approach to the Indian and Pacific Ocean basins. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), an outgrowth of cooperation and communication born after the 2004 tsunami, became a strategic force during President Donald Trump’s first term.

President Joe Biden overlaid the Quad framework with the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) strategic framework. The problem with both formulations, however, is that they tended to focus upon the eastern Indian Ocean, where the threat of Chinese expansionism was most apparent.

Given Chinese “salami-slicing” in the South China Sea and China’s growing belligerence toward Taiwan, such a focus might be understandable. Chinese ambition, however, is pan-regional if not global.

On August 1, 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, just a few miles from Camp Lemonnier, home to the US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the primary base of operations for US Africa Command.

While Chinese strategists have often talked about China’s “String of Pearls” as peaceful and economic in motivation, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) permanent presence in Djibouti suggested a greater ambition.

With a logistics hub in Djibouti, the PLAN can access the entirety of the Indian Ocean basin, operating in the eastern Indian Ocean from its South Sea Fleet headquarters in Zhanjiang and its subsidiary based in Yulin and Longpo, and in the Western Indian Ocean and Red Sea from its Djibouti base.

The willingness of Cambodia to give China access to the Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand also furthers China’s reach, as does Mauritius’s increasingly warm ties to China.

In this context, the British transfer of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius is strategically incongruent, especially as history and cultural links do not support Mauritius’ claim. Even British officials are hard-pressed to explain why Prime Minister Keir Starmer reversed London’s position to support Mauritius’ claim.

What might have been his virtue signaling to a progressive, anti-colonial base could have profound ramifications in the strategic balance of the Indian Ocean, as it makes the future of the joint US-UK military base on Diego Garcia in question, especially if China continues to increase its influence in Mauritius, India’s airfield in Agalega notwithstanding.

With China expanding its reach, neither the US nor India can any longer afford to take the western Indian Ocean and its littoral African states for granted. The second term Trump administration has given lip service to a more expansive Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The November 2025 National Security Strategy, for example, called on India to be more proactive in Indo-Pacific security and declared “keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes” to be a goal of US strategy.

However, the fact that the Strategy treated Red Sea navigation almost as an afterthought and then addressed it only in the context of Middle East challenges suggests continued incoherence. After all, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland are African; their postures and security can impact freedom of navigation as much as Yemen and Saudi Arabia do.

On Jan. 23 the Pentagon released its new National Defense Strategy. Its importance is not only about what it says but also what it omits. While the Strategy mentions China almost two dozen times, it does not explicitly mention India. It sidelines Africa, with its few references relegated to counterterrorism.

It does, however, continue a broad focus on the Indo-Pacific Region and calls upon the US to “deter China in the Indo-Pacific” and to “set the military conditions required to achieve the [2025] NSS goal of a balance of power” in the region.

Absent a more sustained focus by the US or its chief strategic allies, Washington will forfeit that balance of power. Trump’s tariff policy and his embrace of Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief of staff, have shaken US-India bilateral ties. New Delhi essentially has a choice: it must be proactive in the western Indian Ocean to deny space to China or it must coordinate with the US to the same end goal.

New Delhi must determine how to outcompete Beijing not only in Mauritius and South Africa, but also in Kenya and Tanzania. While India commissioned the INS Jatayu in 2024 on Mincoy Island in the Lakshadweep Islands, it should push its military footprint further.

That would not only expand its military footprint in Agalega but also replicate it should China use its investments in Mauritius to leverage India out. India should also expand its presence in northern Madagascar and use its considerable, if underutilized, diplomatic and financial power to establish its own permanent naval base on Zanzibar or in Mombasa.

Indian politicians – especially old-guard officials with a more left-of-center outlook – might scoff at such military expansion, but the goal is not presence, but rather the growth and soft power ties that security can bring. An Indian base in Mombasa or Zanzibar would naturally attract follow-on Indian investment that would quickly become a hub for deeper commercial penetration in Africa.

If the Democratic Republic of Congo holds US$24 trillion in untapped minerals, metals and rare earths, there is no reason why New Delhi and Washington should cede the field to Beijing. Indeed, Trump’s second-term efforts to make peace in Africa’s Great Lakes region are predicated on an ability to tap Congo’s strategic resources.

This might also represent a formula for US-Indian cooperation in Africa, with the US taking the lead in the interior and India developing its resources along the coast, all toward a common aim based in trade, free markets, regional development, and security.

India’s initial refusal to recognize Somaliland seems a strategic own goal on the part of its Ministry of External Affairs. The Ministry’s statement explaining, “India has longstanding ties with Somalia. We continue to underline the importance of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country,” suggests ignorance of history and law.

Somalia and Somaliland represent a failed confederation akin to the United Arab Republic and Senegambia. In both those cases, India reverted recognition to their constituent parts as the federations failed.

India’s endorsement of Mogadishu, too, stands in direct contradiction to the precedent it set when it recognized Bangladesh’s independence. For India to embrace Somaliland, alone or in conjunction with the US, would signal that India will protect its interests across the entirety of the Indian Ocean Basin and compete with China.

Simply having a presence would raise costs to China and force Beijing to recalculate its interests and outlays. For India to control a naval base while the US controls the nearby airfield could help develop interoperability and cooperation long after the current bilateral tensions dissipate.

Even if India does not want to enter Somaliland – though the US might do so regardless – Mozambique remains a fertile ground for strategic development. Rwanda has largely defeated the Ansar al-Sunna/Islamic State-Mozambique insurgency.

A social factor behind the initial eruption of insurgency was the traditional underdevelopment of northern Cabo Delgado. But it is gas-rich and Pemba has a natural deep-water harbor.

Given the traditionally warm ties between New Delhi and Maputo, India might be the perfect investor to develop the region to mutually benefit of India, Mozambique and the local people in Cabo Delgado.

The US can issue National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies and believe it is countering China, but rhetoric alone will not counter Beijing’s ambitions, nor will a narrow focus on the Indo-Pacific region, which in practice excludes everything west of Kanyakumari (Cape Comorin).

If the White House is going to counter or roll back Chinese influence, it must first choose whether to do so alone or to repair its frayed ties with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government to work in partnership.

If the latter, then there needs to be a discussion about division of labor: Will India take the lead on the littoral states and the US focus on the interior? Should the US and India, as democracies, embrace Somaliland? What new military bases are needed and where?

With the Chinese already entrenched in Djibouti, security in the Indian Ocean will not begin and end with threats from the South China Sea or a Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal.

Michael Rubin ([email protected]) is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

This article first appeared on Pacific Forum and is republished with permission.

When the US renamed Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018, then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis warned that China’s strategic competition extends well beyond the South China Sea and Bay of Bengal. US doctrine has since adopted a broader Indo-Pacific framing, and security initiatives such as the Quad and AUKUS reflect that shift. Yet both frameworks have tended to focus on the eastern Indian Ocean, where Chinese expansionism is most visible, while neglecting the western Indian Ocean and Africa’s littoral states—areas where Beijing’s reach is growing and where strategic balance can be lost.

China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, opened in August 2017 near the US base at Camp Lemonnier, signaled a shift. A permanent PLAN presence there gives China access across the Indian Ocean basin: from its South Sea Fleet in southern China to the western Indian Ocean and Red Sea. Chinese access is also expanding through places like Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base and warmer ties with Mauritius.

The recent British decision to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius could complicate long-standing UK-US military arrangements on Diego Garcia and is difficult to justify historically. If China deepens influence in Mauritius, the future of the joint US–UK presence in the central Indian Ocean may be at risk. Given such shifts, neither the US nor India can take the western Indian Ocean and its African partners for granted.

US strategy documents offer mixed signals. The 2025 National Security Strategy affirmed keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open but treated Red Sea navigation mainly in Middle East terms, downplaying African states’ roles. The 2026 National Defense Strategy mentions China repeatedly but sidelines Africa, largely confining it to counterterrorism. Without sustained attention to Africa, Washington risks surrendering strategic space to Beijing.

India faces its own choice. To deny China influence in the western Indian Ocean, New Delhi must be proactive there or coordinate closely with the US. That means competing with Beijing not only in Mauritius and South Africa but also in East African states such as Kenya and Tanzania. India’s commissioning of assets in the Lakshadweep and Agalega points to interest in the region, but a larger footprint is needed.

Practical steps for India include expanding presence in Agalega, northern Madagascar, and establishing a permanent naval base in Mombasa or Zanzibar. Such security posts would not only raise the cost for China to operate in the region but also encourage Indian investment, trade, and soft-power ties. Military presence can catalyze commercial penetration and development rather than simply reflect militarization.

Washington and New Delhi could coordinate their strengths: the US focusing on inland engagement and regional security partnerships, India concentrating on coastal and maritime ties. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s enormous untapped mineral wealth is an example where US engagement in the interior, paired with Indian coastal investment and trade, could compete directly with Chinese influence.

Recognition policy also matters. India’s initial refusal to recognize Somaliland—citing Somalia’s sovereignty—contradicts precedents where India adjusted recognition in response to failed federations (e.g., Bangladesh). If India, possibly alongside the US, embraced Somaliland, it would signal willingness to protect interests across the Indian Ocean basin and force Beijing to recalibrate its strategy. Joint Indian naval presence with US air infrastructure nearby could foster long-term interoperability and deter unilateral Chinese advances.

Other African opportunities include Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado. After setbacks from insurgency, the region’s underdevelopment contrasts with its gas wealth and deep-water port at Pemba. India’s historically warm ties with Mozambique position it to be a suitable investor to develop resources and infrastructure, benefiting local populations while countering Chinese economic leverage.

Rhetoric in Washington—national strategies and defense documents—is insufficient by itself. A narrow Indo-Pacific focus that effectively excludes areas west of India’s southern tip will not roll back Chinese influence. If the US chooses partnership with India, both must define a division of labor: who leads with littoral states, whether to endorse Somaliland, and where new bases or facilities are needed.

With China already entrenched in Djibouti, securing the Indian Ocean will require attention to the whole basin, including Africa’s coastal states. Absent coordinated US-Indian engagement in the western Indian Ocean, Beijing will continue to expand its presence and influence.

Michael Rubin ([email protected]) is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

This article first appeared on Pacific Forum and is republished with permission.

In May 2018, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis renamed US Pacific Command to US Indo‑Pacific Command, recognizing that strategic competition with China spans both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. US defense doctrine and partnerships—like the Quad and AUKUS—reflected that broader approach, but operational focus has tended toward the eastern Indian Ocean where Chinese expansionism is most visible.

Chinese ambition, however, is pan‑regional. In August 2017 China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, near the US base at Camp Lemonnier, giving the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) a logistics hub that enables operations across the Indian Ocean basin—from China’s South Sea Fleet in the east to the Red Sea and western Indian Ocean via Djibouti. Chinese access in places such as Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base and warming ties with Mauritius further extend Beijing’s reach.

Recent British policy that transfers the Chagos Islands to Mauritius complicates the strategic balance in the western Indian Ocean. That decision raises questions about the future of the joint US‑UK base on Diego Garcia and illustrates how political choices in Europe can reshape regional security calculations, especially if China deepens influence in Mauritius despite India’s airfield at Agalega.

Given this trajectory, the United States and India can no longer take the western Indian Ocean and its African littoral states for granted. The 2025 US National Security Strategy called for a free and open Indo‑Pacific and urged India to play a proactive role, but treated Red Sea navigation and the western Indian Ocean as secondary, addressing them mainly through a Middle East lens. The Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy repeatedly cites China but does not explicitly mention India and largely sidelines Africa, reducing the continent to counterterrorism concerns.

Absent sustained focus by the US and its strategic partners, Washington risks losing the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. US‑India ties have been strained by policy choices; yet strategically, New Delhi must choose whether to compete with Beijing independently in the western Indian Ocean or to coordinate robustly with Washington. India should broaden its maritime footprint beyond recent steps—such as commissioning INS Jatayu in Lakshadweep—by strengthening presence around Agalega and expanding into northern Madagascar, Zanzibar, or Mombasa. An Indian naval presence on Africa’s coast would raise the cost to China and attract follow‑on investment and soft power gains, not merely military influence.

Economic stakes are high: the Democratic Republic of Congo’s vast untapped minerals and rare earths offer strategic resources that India and the US should contest with China. Trump administration engagements in Africa’s Great Lakes region underscored the importance of linking security and resource access. A division of labor—where the US focuses on interior African partnerships and India builds coastal engagement—could align trade, development, and security goals.

Diplomacy matters too. India’s initial refusal to recognize Somaliland was a strategic mistake. Somaliland and Somalia functioned as a failed union; recognizing Somaliland would be consistent with precedents India set in other cases and would signal Indian willingness to defend its interests across the Indian Ocean basin. Joint or parallel US‑India engagement with Somaliland could enable complementary security arrangements—India controlling a naval base while the US operates a nearby airfield—to deepen interoperability and long‑term partnership.

Mozambique offers another opportunity. With the insurgency in Cabo Delgado waning and the region’s gas resources and Pemba’s deep harbor, India could be an ideal partner for development and security cooperation, benefiting Mozambique and regional stability.

Rhetoric in US strategy documents will not by itself counter Beijing. If Washington is serious about rolling back Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean, it must repair and deepen ties with New Delhi and agree on a practical division of labor: who leads engagement with littoral states, who works the interior, what new bases or facilities are necessary, and how to incorporate African partners into a durable security and development framework.

Security in the Indian Ocean cannot be confined to threats emanating from the South China Sea or the Bay of Bengal. With Chinese assets already entrenched in Djibouti and influence spreading across the western Indian Ocean, US and Indian strategy must expand westward to include the African littoral—through diplomacy, investment, and calibrated military presence—to preserve freedom of navigation and a balance of power in the region.

Michael Rubin ([email protected]) is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.