Last week the most consequential development in the Indo-Pacific may not have been the speeches at the Shangri‑La Dialogue but the decisions made earlier at the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. India, Japan, Australia and the United States announced a package of initiatives—support for a port in Fiji, expanded maritime surveillance and domain awareness, critical‑minerals partnerships and related projects—that point to a shift in strategic priorities.
Military competition dominated much of the Shangri‑La conversation, yet the Quad’s emphasis on infrastructure in places like Fiji signals a broader trend: strategic rivalry in the region is moving beyond naval balance-of-power questions to encompass the infrastructure, logistics and communications networks that make trade, energy flows and connectivity possible.
This is not simply a policy tweak. It reflects how economic geography has reemerged as a core element of regional power dynamics. Maritime routes are central to the global economy: roughly four‑fifths of global trade by volume moves by sea, and a handful of choke points and corridors—from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait into the South China Sea and the Pacific—concentrate enormous commercial and energy flows. The South China Sea alone handles about a third of global maritime trade (valued in the trillions annually) and carries more than 30 percent of crude oil shipments and nearly 40 percent of global liquefied natural gas volumes.
As commerce and supply chains concentrate along a narrow set of sea lanes and chokepoints, infrastructure—ports, logistics hubs, undersea cables, and telecommunications systems—has gained strategic weight. These assets are no longer judged only by their commercial return but also by resilience, access and economic security. Who builds, finances and controls connectivity increasingly matters for states’ economic lifelines.
China’s growing economic reach has accelerated this framing. Beijing is the largest trading partner for many East and Southeast Asian states, and through the Belt and Road Initiative and other investments Chinese firms have financed and constructed ports, roads and digital links across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific. Beyond isolated projects, the cumulative expansion of Chinese commercial presence in ports, cables and telecoms has generated concerns in Canberra, Tokyo and New Delhi about the strategic implications of a dense, region‑wide footprint.
The Pacific Islands have become a particular focus. For decades they sat at the margins of Indo‑Pacific strategic thinking; today, diplomatic engagement and infrastructure investment across Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and elsewhere have elevated their importance. Small populations mask vast maritime domains: Pacific island states collectively control millions of square kilometers of exclusive economic zones that sit astride routes linking Asia, Oceania and the Americas. Those maritime spaces now form part of the wider communications and logistics architecture of the region.
Digital connectivity deepens that significance. More than 95 percent of international data traffic travels over submarine cables, and several major cable systems linking North America, Asia and Oceania run through or near Pacific Island territories. As economies and security systems grow more digitally dependent, the integrity and governance of undersea cables and related networks have become strategic concerns on par with ports and shipping lanes.
That context explains the Quad’s Fiji initiative and the pairing of infrastructure support with maritime domain awareness programs. By combining investment in physical facilities with improved surveillance and information sharing, the Quad is trying to strengthen connectivity while increasing visibility across maritime spaces critical for trade, data and influence.
Similar logic underlies India’s Great Nicobar project in the eastern Indian Ocean. Situated near the western approaches to the Malacca Strait and adjacent to the Six Degree Channel, Great Nicobar occupies a key position along a corridor through which a large share of Asian energy imports transit—estimates suggest about three‑quarters of China’s oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait. Developing ports, logistics and surveillance on Great Nicobar would enhance India’s ability to monitor activity in the eastern Indian Ocean and to support naval and civilian operations that reinforce regional connectivity.
Viewed together, Fiji and Great Nicobar illustrate a widening agenda that stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. The Quad is often cast chiefly as a response to China’s military rise, but its initiatives increasingly target economic and infrastructure vulnerabilities: critical minerals, undersea cables, supply‑chain resilience, digital infrastructure and maritime domain awareness. These domains sit at the intersection of economic security and strategic competition and are now central to alliance and partnership strategies.
Deterrence and military posture remain vital, as the Shangri‑La discussions made clear. But the longer game in the Indo‑Pacific will be shaped by who shapes and secures the networks through which trade, energy, data and influence flow. The Quad’s recent moves reflect that reality: the competition is as much about ports, cables and minerals as it is about ships and bases.
Vivek Y Kelkar is a researcher focused on the intersection of geoeconomics, geopolitics and corporate strategy.
