On April 28 the State Department issued a joint statement “in solidarity with Panama” after an uptick in detentions of Panama‑flagged vessels at Chinese ports, calling the moves “a blatant attempt to politicize maritime trade.” That gesture follows a concerted US effort—diplomatic coercion and lawfare—to displace Chinese logistics infrastructure at Panama’s Balboa and Cristobal terminals, and sits alongside broader US maritime and security actions: a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a defense partnership with Indonesia, and pressure over projects like Peru’s Port of Chancay.
The countries signing the Panama statement—Costa Rica, Bolivia, Paraguay, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago—look random only at first glance. They align with US economic and security priorities in the hemisphere. Guyana is a breakout light‑crude producer attracting investment as access to Persian Gulf oil is constrained. Trinidad supplies petrochemicals. Costa Rica hosts one of the region’s most advanced ports. Paraguay still recognizes Taiwan. And Bolivia—landlocked and often overlooked—matters because of its vast lithium reserves.
Bolivia’s salt‑flat brines contain the world’s largest lithium but a high magnesium‑to‑lithium ratio makes extraction costly and technologically demanding. Exporting lithium also requires moving heavy loads across difficult terrain to Chilean ports and then through canals and logistics chokepoints—so every ton carries a premium. Bolivia’s new president, Rodrigo Paz, has already shown he’s willing to undo Chinese and Russian deals if Western capital can guarantee markets: replacing the head of the state lithium company signals openness to Western investment and to playing by US‑preferred rules. For Bolivia’s foreign ministry, endorsing a US statement about Panama’s role in maritime trade is a low‑cost transactional move to secure access to regional logistics.
Seen through this lens, US diplomacy in Panama and Bolivia is not isolated charity. It’s part of a wider strategy to redirect energy, agricultural, mining, and logistics flows toward the Western Hemisphere and away from West Asia. The State Department’s campaign to displace Chinese capital through audits, legal actions, and diplomatic pressure—paired with US naval control or interdiction in key oil routes—suggests a deliberate effort to shape new maritime trade routes and trading partners in service of American industry and security goals.
That objective is what the “Donroe Doctrine” amounts to in practice: not cooperative integration but a coercive reordering of trade and logistics networks to favor US interests. Promoting a new maritime consensus with Latin American producers of oil, petrochemicals, green metals, and agricultural inputs dovetails with Washington’s desire to source critical commodities outside contested regions and from partners willing to accept US rules.
The US posture is increasingly inconsistent with claims of neutral stewardship of global maritime trade. While the State Department admonishes China for politicizing trade in Central and South America, the US military is actively seizing ships and enforcing blockades in West Asia. The romantic idea of a free global maritime commons under US guardianship has effectively died as Washington narrows its definition of acceptable behavior and reshapes access to ports and supply chains.
Whether this reorientation succeeds is uncertain. In the long run, coercive US moves may drive coastal and trading nations closer to China and other powers, undermining American goals. In the short term, however, the resulting instability gives the State Department and US industry opportunities to capitalize on new alignments and to pull critical supply chains into the Western Hemisphere—at the expense of Chinese influence and amid rising global maritime friction.
