Hungary’s most consequential election in decades delivered a major victory for democracy and accountability. Opposition leader Peter Magyar’s decisive defeat of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party ends 16 years of entrenched corruption and semi‑authoritarian rule and will resonate well beyond Budapest.
Framed as a choice between a westward turn or continued authoritarian drift, Magyar’s win is a clear rebuke to the transnational currents of nativism, division and grievance politics that have become mainstream in many places. The result did not hinge on turnout or the scale of the victory alone. More than 74% of eligible voters cast ballots and Magyar’s Tisza party secured a commanding supermajority — at least 138 of 199 parliamentary seats — giving it the parliamentary muscle needed to roll back Orbán’s institutional hold.
Perhaps the most unexpected moment came after the vote: Orbán conceded quickly. He avoided attempts to manufacture a crisis or to use state security forces to cling to power — moves that could have sparked large, potentially violent protests akin to so‑called “color revolutions.” That restraint will be a relief to liberal Hungarians and to the European Union.
Why Orbán became vulnerable
Magyar must act fast but prudently to enact change without alienating moderate former Fidesz supporters. His request that President Tamás Sulyok and other Orbán loyalists step down signals an appetite to dismantle the legal and constitutional scaffolding of Orbán’s rule — a task made possible by the Tisza supermajority. Unlike fully consolidated autocracies, Orbán’s regime retained openings that allowed a disciplined opposition to capitalize on public anger.
Orbán’s rule did have many hallmarks of authoritarianism: engineered electoral maps and other structural advantages for Fidesz, the diversion of state funds to loyal municipalities and provinces, and a media landscape skewed in favor of the government. Yet opposition weakness and fragmentation helped him stay in power for so long. Magyar, a onetime ally of Orbán, ran a coordinated campaign that neutralized these advantages and presented a viable alternative.
Underlying all this was popular frustration with failing governance. Hungary consistently ranked among Europe’s worst performers on corruption indices, finished last in the EU for relative household wealth, and suffered high inflation and economic stagnation in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Images of extravagant estates owned by political insiders helped crystallize public outrage over inequality.
Wider geopolitical losers: Russia and the Trump orbit
The biggest foreign loser is Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Orbán had been the EU’s most pro‑Kremlin member, repeatedly obstructing aid for Ukraine and complicating EU responses to the war. Moscow even dispatched political operatives to assist Orbán’s campaign. Revelations that senior Hungarian officials leaked confidential EU discussions to Russia further exposed the depth of Kremlin influence in Budapest. A reported October 2025 phone transcript in which Orbán likened himself to a mouse helping a caged Russian lion underscored the closeness of the relationship.
The Trump White House also finds itself on the losing side. U.S. involvement in support of Orbán — notably a pre‑election visit by Vice President J.D. Vance and public promises from Donald Trump to use “the full Economic Might of the United States” to help Orbán — looked like direct intervention. That support failed to sway the Hungarian electorate and now publicly associates the Trump orbit with defeat. The episode highlights both the limits of U.S. foreign‑interference efforts and Washington’s ideological framing in recent policy documents that portray Europe as in need of U.S. guidance to resist perceived civilizational decline.
A broader repudiation of “Putinisation”?
Magyar’s victory can be read as a rejection of the global movements some analysts call the “Putinisation” of politics — alliances of authoritarian influence, ultraconservative networks and populist grievance politics. Hungary under Orbán had become a hub for ultraconservative transatlantic linkages: think tanks and institutes aligned with MAGA‑style politics, a CPAC presence that drew figures like Tony Abbott, Nigel Farage and Tucker Carlson, and cultural campaigns against liberal social norms. The election suggests that such currents are not invincible.
But other powers will be watching closely. China has made large investments in Hungary, especially in electric vehicle and battery manufacturing, using the country as a gateway into the EU market. Beijing will be attentive to whether Magyar prioritizes European alignment over those economic ties.
Who benefits — and the risks ahead
The EU will welcome the outcome as proof that its norms and incentives still matter, and Ukraine may find it easier to secure support now that a major opponent within the EU has been sidelined. Yet the global trend toward illiberalism has not been reversed. Lessons from Hungary will be studied by far‑right actors elsewhere, including in the United States ahead of midterm contests. If they conclude that Orbán’s authoritarianism was too restrained, some may pursue harder, more overtly repressive strategies.
For Hungarians, the election opens a path to restore democratic institutions and rule of law. For the rest of the world, it is a warning that progress is neither assured nor irreversible — and that the form authoritarianism takes can vary, requiring constant vigilance and political renewal.
Matthew Sussex is associate professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
