In the 19th century, Great Britain and Russia fought for control of Central Asia in what came to be called the Great Game. Britain sought to keep Russia away from India, while Russia pushed its empire southward. Today a similar contest is underway, though it features three main players: the United States on one side and China and Russia on the other.
The stakes are broader geographically — Central Asia again matters, but so do the Middle East, parts of the Americas, and East Asia. The prize is less surface territory than assured access to subterranean riches: fossil fuels and rare earth minerals crucial for a global cyber economy.
Leaders on all sides are driven by national ambition. US President Donald Trump has been an especially active participant, prioritizing a self-centered nationalism embodied in “Make America Great Again” rather than the democracy-promoting rationales used by many 20th-century US presidents. Vladimir Putin seeks a restored imperial Russia to reassert Moscow’s global weight, and Xi Jinping aims to usher China into a “New Era” that displaces US dominance.
This rivalry has eroded decades of institutions meant to prevent catastrophic war. “The axioms of the neoliberal order are rapidly being replaced by something closer to the law of the jungle,” observed Quillette, noting a turn toward naked self-interest over moral agendas. All three powers are militarily capable; China is also a major economic presence worldwide. But the US retains advantages from its post–World War II economic and military reach. As Michael Beckley of Tufts wrote in Foreign Affairs, “The American sphere now stands alone.” He argued that China and Russia can intimidate and disrupt but lack the capacity to consolidate regional control or project sustained power into the US sphere.
That perceived US strength is reflected in rhetoric from inside the administration. Stephen Miller, deputy chief of staff, put it bluntly: “We live in a world that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world.”
The Iran crisis illustrates the New Great Game in action. The Trump administration deployed naval forces — including aircraft carriers and escort ships — to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. Initial claims blaming Iranian repression of protesters gave way to demands that Iran abandon any nuclear ambitions and cease support for anti-Israeli armed groups in Lebanon, Yemen and Gaza. Iran offered talks over its nuclear program, insisting it is peaceful, but rejected other American demands and warned of retaliatory strikes on US allies in the region.
Iran’s defenses were weakened by prior Israeli strikes and a US rocket attack on an underground Iranian nuclear facility following Iran’s support for Hamas after the October 7, 2023 attacks on Israel. The limited response from Russia and China to those attacks exposed the limits of Tehran’s partnerships. Jonathan Roll of Stanford’s Hoover Institution called Moscow’s and Beijing’s muted reactions a “dog that didn’t bark” moment, suggesting the US may enjoy greater freedom of action than often assumed.
In a signal response, Russia and China have sent ships to the Strait of Hormuz to join Iran in naval drills, billed as testing coordination and ensuring safe navigation. But those moves also highlighted risks to Moscow’s and Beijing’s stakes: Russia supplies weapons to Iran while receiving thousands of Iranian-made drones used in Ukraine; China gets discounted Iranian oil — about 14% of its annual needs — and has invested in infrastructure projects such as a freight corridor through Iran tied to the Belt and Road Initiative. A subdued or US-aligned Iran could threaten those economic ties.
Washington’s New Great Game extends into Central Asia as well. The US, following Biden-era efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road, has pursued contracts for rare earths and other minerals across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Central Asian states welcome US attention as a counterweight to Moscow and Beijing, wary especially of Russian forceful tendencies — a concern amplified by Putin’s justifications for invading Ukraine, which cited protection of ethnic Russians abroad, and by Russia’s own aggressive regional posture.
Trump’s operations in Latin America have also signaled US intent to reassert traditional hemispheric dominance. The administration’s bold operation against Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro — presented by Trump aides as a setback to Moscow and Beijing’s influence in the Caribbean — underscored that the US aims to control Venezuelan oil resources “indefinitely,” according to Trump. China had been buying roughly 400,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil per day, paid in yuan at sub-market prices; Russian and Chinese military and economic assistance to Maduro made Venezuela a focus of great-power competition.
Panama became another flashpoint. A proposed Hong Kong company acquisition of two ports at either end of the Panama Canal alarmed US officials as a potential Chinese foothold. US pressure, including visits by senior officials warning of threats to security, coincided with Panamanian judicial action that annulled the sale; the ports were later sold to American buyers. Beijing called the cancellation “shameful and pathetic,” warning of heavy political and economic costs for Panama.
The Trump administration also tightened oil shipments from Venezuela to Cuba, worsening Cuba’s chronic energy shortages and prompting the Cuban government to offer negotiations to ease the US blockade. Meanwhile, Trump publicly mused about buying Greenland and even suggested more forceful steps to secure strategic Arctic assets as Russia and China increase activity in the Arctic Ocean. Denmark rejected the purchase idea; NATO and Danish defenses were subsequently emphasized as the matter cooled.
East Asia remains a central theater. China’s primary objective is reunification with Taiwan, but its broader strategy aims to dominate the Taiwan Strait, intimidate Japan and the Philippines, and assert control over the so-called “first island chain.” Since Xi Jinping’s rise in 2013, China has increasingly employed “gray zone” tactics — sabotage, disinformation, and stepped-up military probes — to pressure Taiwan. Incursions by Chinese military aircraft into Taiwan’s airspace rose dramatically: from under 100 annually before 2020 to hundreds and then thousands in subsequent years, peaking in the mid-2020s. The 2024 election of Lai Ching-te prompted “Justice Mission 2025,” a massive drill simulating a blockade of Taiwan.
Beijing’s rhetoric has grown harsher. Defense Minister Li Shangfu warned in 2023 that the Chinese military would “resolutely safeguard China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, at all costs.” China has laid quasi-legal claims to reefs and islets around the Taiwan Strait and has shadowed US and allied ships. The China Coast Guard maintained a near-continuous presence around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands and has confronted South Korean and Philippine vessels, while Chinese aircraft increasingly challenge Australian and Philippine patrols.
Analysts warn the risk of Chinese military attack on Taiwan should not be underestimated. The Institute for Regional Security argued China’s evolution toward intimidation and large-scale drills increases the danger of direct conflict. Sam Mullins of the Inouye Asia-Pacific Center noted China’s coordinated use of military pressure, economic coercion, cyber operations and information campaigns to reshape regional order and exploit fragmented deterrence.
The US has responded with arms sales and alliance-building. The Trump administration approved a proposed $40 billion weapons sale to Taiwan, provoking strong Chinese condemnation. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan have boosted defense spending, and the US has expanded its presence in the Philippines — moves Xi described as efforts to “contain” China.
Across theaters, the New Great Game is a contest of influence, resources and strategic positioning among three major powers. The US leans on military reach, alliances and economic leverage; China presses economic statecraft and gray-zone coercion alongside growing military capability; Russia uses hard power, arms sales and strategic partnerships where it can. The interplay of these strategies — in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Arctic, Latin America and Southeast Asia — is reshaping global order and returning great-power rivalry to a scale not seen in decades.
