As the United States contemplates fresh strikes on Iran, the risk of a wider regional war is back in focus. For Washington’s allies, the question is no longer whether escalation might occur, but how to respond if it becomes a sustained conflict.
Australia faces a familiar dilemma: balancing regional stability with an assertive ally intent on reshaping the Middle East by force. Canberra distanced itself from last year’s strikes on Iranian nuclear sites—expressing tacit approval while insisting the actions were “unilateral” US operations. Seven months on, a broader, prolonged conflict would likely demand a more proactive stance. Yet Australia is critically unprepared for this dimension of alliance politics.
Part of the problem is strategic tunnel vision. Successive Australian policies have narrowed focus to the Indo-Pacific, boosting engagement and funding across Southeast Asia and the Pacific. That regional concentration, however understandable, has come at the expense of tracking developments in regions that will inevitably affect Australia’s neighbourhood and interests.
By largely sidestepping the Middle East, Australia has missed chances to influence outcomes and to prepare for spillover: mass displacement, migration, and other downstream effects of a regional war—situations where treaty obligations and national interests could be tested.
Australia has also failed to connect the strategic dots between regime change in Iran and China’s expanding reach across Eurasia, including its growing foothold in the Indian Ocean. Any major upheaval in Iran would have enormous consequences for China and for the balance of influence across the Indo‑Pacific.
Now, as the US again seeks decisive action against Iran, Australia finds itself with limited capacity either to support or to dissuade Washington. That reflects a broader failure to engage actively with the US administration and Israel, while deepening pragmatic ties across the Gulf and with other Arab states.
This blind spot need not be permanent. A Middle East shaped by renewed US strategy can align with Australia’s own interests. As a maritime trading nation, Australia benefits from stability in the Indian Ocean. Threats from Iranian-backed proxies in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz endanger chokepoints through which much of Australia’s oil transits. The strategic convergence among Iran, North Korea and Russia also strengthens the case for closer alignment with US initiatives designed to counter those threats coherently.
How could Australia increase its stake in the Middle East without jeopardising relations with Muslim-majority neighbours like Indonesia or alarming Beijing? Greater engagement should go beyond simple alignment with US policy and focus on deepening pragmatic ties with regional players such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Australia could offer tangible support for a sustained campaign that aims to degrade the Ayatollah regime, while leaning on national strengths and existing strategic tracks.
A few options stand out. First, AUKUS: with uncertainty around Pillar I, moving decisively on Pillar II—interoperability in undersea, cyber and electronic warfare—is a strategic no‑brainer. Demonstrating AUKUS utility beyond submarines would reassure allies and expand Australia’s practical contributions. Second, Australia’s naval position as an Indian Ocean littoral state makes it both geographically removed from and strategically relevant to Middle East contingencies. NATO members have shown how logistical air support sustains US operations; Australia could similarly contribute naval and discreet air support from rear areas if Gulf states restrict access.
Complementing the US presence on Diego Garcia, Australia’s northern and western coasts are well placed to support long‑range and stand‑off operations when bases closer to the Middle East are politically sensitive. The US already has a growing footprint across northern and western Australia, including a Submarine Rotational Force West at HMAS Stirling and Marine Rotational Forces in Darwin. While these assets have been oriented primarily toward Indo‑Pacific contingencies, they could be adapted to support a broader US‑led campaign.
Any Australian involvement should be rooted in strategic flexibility and national calculation, not in acquiescence to Washington. The potential dividends—for alliance cohesion, influence in Australia’s near region, and protection of vital sea lanes—are substantial.
Johannes Kornberger is an Australian geopolitical analyst and founder of Mackinder Advisory, a boutique strategic communications consultancy, having held prior positions with UNHCR, the Council of Europe, and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
